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This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for 
distributions of bidders' values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the 
case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data 
pertain to the winner's identity and the transaction price. My proof of identification 
is constructive and is based on establishing the existence and uniqueness of a 
solution to the system of non-linear differential equations that describes 
relationships between unknown distribution functions and observable functions. 
The proof is conducted in two logical steps. First, I prove the existence and 
uniqueness of a local solution. Then I describe a method that extends this local 
solution to the whole support.   
 
This paper delivers other interesting results. I show how this approach can be 
applied to obtain identification in more general auction settings, for instance, in 
auctions with stochastic number of bidders or weaker support conditions. 
Furthermore, I demonstrate that my results can be extended to generalized 
competing risks models.  Moreover, contrary to results in classical competing risks 
(Roy model), I show that in this generalized class of models it is possible to obtain 
implications that can be used to check whether the risks in a model are dependent. 
Finally, I provide a sieve minimum distance estimator and show that it consistently 
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In auctions, researchers are often interested in learning models’ economic primitives, par-
ticularly the joint distribution of bidders’ values. Because this underlying distribution is
not known a priori, it must be learned from the data. To obtain credible estimation re-
sults, a researcher must ￿rst study the identi￿cation question to determine whether the
distribution of interest is identi￿ed or whether there are many distributions consistent
with the data. The importance of this issue has generated many methodological papers on
identi￿cation in auction models. This paper contributes to that literature.
The paper examines the nonparametric identi￿cation of the distributions of bidders’
values in asymmetric second-price auctions. The identi￿cation analysis cannot be con-
ducted without (a) imposing conditions on the joint distribution of bidders’ signals and
(b) specifying what data are available from the auctions’ outcomes. This paper assumes
that bidders have private values and that the only available data pertain to the winner’s
identity and the transaction price. Identi￿cation in this framework was ￿rst considered in
Athey and Haile (2002).
It is well known that in second-price auctions within the private-values framework, a
weakly dominant strategy for bidders entails submitting their true value.1 I consider an
equilibrium where bidders employ this strategy. In this case, even though the submitted
bids directly reveal bidders’ values, the joint distribution of these values cannot be identi￿ed
nonparametrically because not all the bids are observed. This result is established in Athey
and Haile (2002). The identi￿cation of the parameter of interest requires strengthening
the model’s assumptions. This paper shows that in our problem, it su￿ces to assume that
bidders’ values are independent. There are three main issues to address in obtaining this
result. First, the distribution functions must be identi￿ed nonparametrically in order to
avoid incorrect assumptions about their form. Second, there is the challenge posed by the
asymmetry of the bidders participating in the auction. Finally, given that the transaction
price is the value of the second-highest bid, the identi￿cation proof must be based on the
second-order statistic.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to provide conditions on observable data
su￿cient to guarantee point identi￿cation. First, I present the conditions on the observ-
ables that are necessary and su￿cient for the existence of a solution to the model; thus, we
always know with certainty whether the model has a solution. I then show that these con-
ditions, together with an additional condition on the observables, are su￿cient to show the
uniqueness of a solution and therefore to ensure the identi￿cation of distribution functions.
The main su￿cient identi￿cation condition can be formulated in terms of observables as
well as in terms of unobservables. It is interpretable and is weaker than identi￿cation
conditions usually assumed in auctions. Another contribution of the paper is to prove that
1See, for example, Vickrey (1961) or Krishna (2002).
2when there are only two types of bidders, identi￿cation always holds. This result is gener-
alized for the case when there are only two types of the bidders and the joint distribution of
bidders’ values is given by an Archimedean copula. I obtain a condition on the generating
function of a copula that is su￿cient for identi￿cation. This condition is satis￿ed for many
classes of Archimedean copulas.
A methodological contribution of this paper is to suggest a new approach to proving
identi￿cation in analyzed auction models. The idea behind this method is to establish the
existence and uniqueness of a solution to a system of non-linear di￿erential equations that
relate unknown underlying distribution functions to the observable data. This strategy in-
cludes two major steps. First, I show that the system has a unique solution on a subinterval
of the support; this is what I call a local solution. Second, I demonstrate that this local
solution can be extended to the whole support. This two-step approach is constructive and
enables us to conduct a thorough qualitative analysis of the identi￿cation problem.
Furthermore, the techniques developed in the paper allow for two generalizations of
the auction setting. One relaxes the support conditions and permits distributions to have
di￿erent upper support points as well as holes in the support. The other considers second-
price auctions in which the set of actual bidders is unknown and varies exogenously. Using
the case of three bidders, I outline the speci￿cs of proving identi￿cation in these models.
Athey and Haile (2007) formulate an identi￿cation result for second-price auctions with a
reserve price. When there is a reserve price, bidders participate endogenously. The authors
state that if the winner’s identity, the transaction price and the set of the participants are
observed, then the distributions are identi￿ed for the values above the reserve price. I
explain in detail how this result can be proven by using the techniques of the basic case.
Another contribution of this paper is to uncover conditions su￿cient to determine
whether the model is stated correctly. These conditions do not pertain to the observable
data and can be veri￿ed only after we determine the solution to the system of di￿erential
equations. To address this issue, I present an example of an incorrectly stated model that
proves the possibility of ￿nding well-de￿ned observable functions such that the functions in
the solution corresponding to them are not all monotone ¡ that is, not all of them possess
the properties of distribution functions.
Within the private-values framework, second-price auctions are equivalent to ascending
auctions. For proofs of identi￿cation in these two types of auctions, when the data indicate
only the winner’s identity and the winning price, researchers have referred to results in the
statistical literature that examines identi￿cation in generalized competing risks models.
Athey and Haile (2002) were ￿rst to observe that analyzed auctions can be considered a
special case of these models.
In generalized competing risks models, an object that consists of di￿erent components
fails as a result of the cumulative failure of several of its elements, and the only observed
data pertain to the lifetime of the object and the set of components that had failed before
3the object’s failure. Though the main identi￿cation result for these cases was obtained
by Meilijson (1981), the Meilijson’s proofs lack some essential details, most importantly,
conditions on the observables or on the unknowns that guarantee identi￿cation. I show
that my method, on the other hand, provides an exhaustive proof of identi￿cation in
generalized models. For any of these models, I provide conditions on the observables and
equivalent to them conditions on the unknowns that guarantee that the model cannot have
more than one solution. I also explain why the existence of a solution cannot be proved
in general and must be assumed. For a special class of generalized competing risks models
(one that encompasses our auction models), I present necessary and su￿cient conditions
for existence.
For a thorough overview of nonparametric identi￿cation in auctions, see Athey and Haile
(2002, 2006, 2007) and references therein. The authors obtain numerous nonparametric
identi￿cation results for various auctions settings, and some of the point identi￿cation
results rely on the work of Meilijson (1981). Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006) deal specif-
ically with asymmetric ascending auctions within the independent-private-values frame-
work, considering both single-unit and multi-unit settings. For nonparametric identi￿cation
in single-unit auctions, they also refer to Meilijson (1981). Banerji and Meenakshi (2004)
and Meenakshi and Banerji (2005) also consider asymmetric ascending auctions within the
independent-private-values framework by examining wheat markets in India. Similar to
Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006), they cite Meilijson (1981) to show identi￿cation.
Another thread of the literature related to this paper applies the techniques of the
theory of di￿erential equations to identi￿cation problems. In auctions, examples of such
papers are Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2003); Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009) and
Lebrun (1999). Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2003) prove nonparametric identi￿cation for
asymmetric ￿rst-price auctions with a￿liated private values. Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong
(2009) address the nonparametric identi￿cation of utility functions for bidders in ￿rst-price
auctions, speci￿cally when the bidders are risk averse and have private values. Lebrun
(1999) analyzes ￿rst-price auctions with independent private values and characterizes a
Bayesian equilibrium as a solution to a system of non-linear di￿erential equations. He then
refers to results in the theory of di￿erential equations to show that an equilibrium exists
and that in some special models, it is unique. In a related area of classical competing risks,
Buera (2006) uses the theory of partial di￿erential equations to prove identi￿cation in a
certain class of Roy models.
Because assuming the independence of bidders’ values may seem dubious in some appli-
cations, it is worthwhile to consider auctions in which private values are not independent.
Though the joint distribution of bidders’ values is not identi￿ed, the data are informative
and allow me to derive bounds. More precisely, I obtain bounds on the joint distribution
for any subset of bidders. I show that these bounds continue to hold when the equilibrium
condition is replaced by two weaker assumptions on the bidders’ behavior. These assump-
4tions on rationality were introduced in Haile and Tamer (2003). One assumption is that
the bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay. The other assumption is that
the bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat.
In addition, I analyze how the bounds change when we acquire data on other elements
of the auction model. Namely, I consider the case when data on all the identities and the
bids except for the highest bid become available. For simplicity, I only show bounds on
the joint distribution for the set of all bidders and the marginal distributions.
Finally, the paper also proposes a sieve minimum distance estimator to estimating the
underlying distribution functions in the case of independent values. This estimator is shown
to be consistent in the uniform metric.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews second-price auctions,
outlines generalized competing risks models and explains their connection to auctions.
Section 3 states identi￿cation results for auctions, discusses incorrect speci￿cation and
considers identi￿cation in more general auction settings. Section 4 de￿nes a sieve mini-
mum distance estimator of the distribution functions and explores the properties of the
operator that maps these functions into observable data. The continuity of the inverse of
this operator allows proving the consistency of the sieve estimator in the uniform metric.
Section 5 describes generalized competing risks models in detail and provides identi￿ca-
tion results for these models. Section 6 provides results for the auctions in which bidders’
values are not independent. Proofs of propositions, lemmas and theorems are collected in
appendices.
2 Second-price auctions and generalized competing risks
models
In this section, I ￿rst review second-price auctions. Next, I describe generalized competing
risks models and show their connection to these auctions.
2.1 Second-price auctions within the private-values framework
A single object is up for sale, and d buyers are bidding on it. The set of all bidders is known.
Bids are submitted in sealed envelopes. The highest bidder wins and pays the value of the
second-highest bid; thus, in these auctions, the second-highest bid is the winning price.
Suppose that the bidders have private values and that they are aware of their value. It is
known that in this setting, a weakly dominant strategy for bidders is to submit their true
value ¡ and this is an equilibrium that I consider later. In this paper, only the winner’s
identity and the winning price are observed in auction’s outcomes.
It is worth mentioning that within the private-values framework, second-price auctions
are equivalent to open ascending auctions. One form of ascending auctions is a "button
5auction," in which bidders hold down a button as the auctioneer raises the price. When
the price gets too high for a bidder, she drops out by releasing the button. The auction
ends when only one bidder remains. This person wins the object and pays the price at
which the auction stopped.
2.2 Generalized competing risks models
Now I turn to a brief description of generalized competing risks models. Consider a machine
that consists of several elements. A special case of these models are classical competing
risks models. The classical models correspond to a situation in which a machine breaks
down as soon as one of its components fails; the data available after the breakdown are the
machine’s lifetime and the element that caused the failure. One example of these models
in economics is duration models. Also, the Roy model is isomorphic to classical competing
risks. In the Roy model, a person chooses from a ￿nite set of occupational alternatives to
obtain the highest income, and the outcomes of the choice (occupation and income) are
observed. In biometrics, the death of an individual because of a particular disease when
that person is also facing several other diseases presents a classical competing risks model,
based on a fundamental assumption that a single cause is behind every death.
Generalized competing risks models relax this assumption and consider cases in which
a machine fails because of the cumulative failure of some of its elements rather than a
single one. A fatal set for the machine is a subset of parts such that the failure of all
the parts in the subset causes the failure of the machine; in other words, it is a set of the
elements that failed before the machine broke down. In this paper, the machine’s failure
provides information only about the fatal set and the machine’s lifetime. More details
about generalized competing risks are given in section 5.
2.3 Second-price auctions as a special case of generalized compet-
ing risks models
Athey and Haile (2002) were among the ￿rst ones to notice the connection between second-
price auctions and generalized competing risks models. To clarify the connection, I use the
equivalence of second-price and ascending auctions within the private-values paradigm.
Consider a button auction, as described above, with d bidders. Notice that observing the
identity of the winner is equivalent to observing the identities of the bidders who dropped
out. Compare this auction framework to the following generalized competing risks model.
Assume that a machine consists of d elements and works as long as at least two of its
elements are functioning; in other words, the machine breaks once d ¡ 1 of its elements
are dead. The set of these d ¡ 1 elements is fatal. Clearly, the breakdown of other d ¡ 1
components would also be fatal. A fatal set in this model is an analog of the set of bidders
6that dropped out, and the machine’s lifetime is an analog of the winning price.
3 Identi￿cation in second-price auctions
In this section, I formulate identi￿cation results and present a mathematical description
of the identi￿cation problem. Also, I discuss generalizations of the identi￿cation results
and model’s misspeci￿cation. The proofs of the theorems, propositions and lemmas of this
section are collected in Appendix A.
3.1 Statement of identi￿cation problem
Denote bidders’ private values as Xi, i = 1;:::;d. Assume that these values are inde-
pendent and have absolutely continuous distributions on a common support [t0;T]. Also
assume that bidders’ values at each auction are independent draws from the same joint
distribution. We aim to learn this distribution from the available data. Note that in the
equilibrium, the bids’ joint distribution coincides with the distribution of the bidders’ pri-
vate values. Therefore, if all the bids are observed, then the distribution of values can be
clearly identi￿ed. If some of them are not observed, however, then neither the joint nor the
marginal value distributions can be identi￿ed, as shown in Athey and Haile (2002). Given
that our knowledge is often limited to the second-highest bid, I show that when the only
available data pertain to the bid and the winner’s identity, the marginal distributions of
bidders’ values can be identi￿ed if these values are independent.
Notation
Throughout this paper, I use the following notations. A bid submitted by player i is denoted
as bi. Symbol Mtr represents the transpose of matrix M. The distribution function of Xi is
denoted as Fi, i = 1;:::;d. Function Fi is called positive (negative) if Fi(t) > 0 (Fi(t) < 0)
for t > t0. A vector-valued function F = (F1;:::;Fd)tr on [t0;T] is called positive (negative)
if each of its components Fi is a positive (negative) function. F is referred to as strictly
increasing if each Fi is strictly increasing on [t0;T].
For simplicity, I ￿rst consider the case of three bidders, then generalize the results to
any number of bidders. Because the winner’s identity and the winning price are observed
in an auction’s outcome, then the probability of an event fprice · t; i winsg is known for
any t 2 [t0;T] and any i = 1;2;3. So, for each bidder i, we observe the following function
Gi on [t0;T]:
Gi(t) = Pr(price · t; i wins); i = 1;2;3:
The identi￿cation problem is to determine whether there is only one collection of private
values distribution functions F1, F2 and F3 that rationalize observable functions G1, G2
and G3.
73.2 Necessary conditions on observables
I start by describing the properties of observable functions Gi that follow from the model.
I will say that the model is not stated correctly if at least one of the following conditions
fails to hold: 1) bidders submit their true values; 2) bidders have independent private
values; 3) bidders’ values have absolutely continuous distributions; 4) bidders’ values are
distributed on [t0;T].
The next proposition indicates necessary conditions on observable functions Gi
implied by the model.
Proposition 3.1. If the model is stated correctly, then the following conditions hold:
Necessary conditions (I)
1. Gi(t0) = 0, i = 1;2;3
2. Gi are absolutely continuous on [t0;T], i = 1;2;3
3. Gi are strictly increasing on [t0;T], i = 1;2;3
Proof. By assumption, the distributions of private values Xi are absolutely continuous.
This implies, in particular, that players submit bids equal to t0 with probability 0. Also, t0
is the lower support point for all distributions. These two facts give Condition 1. Condition
2 follows from the absolute continuity of the distributions of Xi. Condition 3 is true because
the support of each Xi is the connected interval [t0;T], without any holes in it.
Even though these conditions are simple, it is worth indicating them because they are
useful in the proof of identi￿cation. As we can see, all the properties of the private val-
ues distributions, except for the assumption of independence and the boundary conditions
Fi(T) = 1, i = 1;2;3, are used in establishing Proposition 3.1. The independence assump-
tion, combined with necessary conditions (I), allows me to obtain the following result.

















(t) = 1: (3.1)
Conditions (3.1) are formulated in terms of both observable and unobservable functions.
They characterize a solution F to the model only in a neighborhood of t0. To be more
precise, they ￿nd the rate of convergence of unknown distribution functions Fi at t0 in
terms of observable functions Gi. These conditions are essential for proving identi￿cation.
The properties of Gi formulated in the next corollary also play an important role in
identi￿cation.















(t) = 0: (3.2)
The reasoning behind conditions (II) is that, no matter how di￿erent the underlying
distributions are, bidders’ probabilities of winning do not have considerably di￿erent rates
of convergence at t0.
Now that I have presented necessary conditions on observables, I turn to describing the
mathematical model of identi￿cation and explain how necessary conditions (I) and (II) are
employed in the identi￿cation proof.
3.3 Mathematical model of the identi￿cation problem
Assuming the independence of bidders’ values, functions Gi can be expressed through Fi
as follows. Let bi, i = 1;2;3, indicate the submitted bids. Then
G1(t) = Pr(maxfb2;b3g < b1;maxfb2;b3g · t)





where integration is to be understood in the sense of Lebesgue. Functions G2 and G3 have
similar expressions. Therefore, unknown distribution functions Fi are related to observable



















Notice that the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equations in (3.3) are absolutely
continuous functions, allowing us to di￿erentiate them and obtain the following system of
di￿erential equations almost everywhere (a.e.) on [t0;T]:
g1 = (F2F3)
0
(1 ¡ F1) (DE)






9where gi stands for the a.e. derivative of Gi. I will refer to system (DE) as the main system.
Distribution functions Fi in this system must satisfy the following initial conditions:
Initial conditions Fi(t0) = 0; i = 1;2;3: (IC)
I will refer to problem (DE)-(IC) as the main problem. The de￿nition below explains the
meaning of a solution to (DE)-(IC).
De￿nition 3.1. Function F = (F1;F2;F3)tr is a solution to problem (DE)-(IC) on an
interval [t0;t0 + a], t0 + a · T, if Fi, i = 1;2;3, are absolutely continuous on [t0;t0 + a],
satisfy equations (DE) a.e. on [t0;t0 + a] and satisfy (IC).
The system of di￿erential equations (DE) is a convenient tool because identifying func-
tions Fi is equivalent to proving that problem (DE)-(IC) has a unique positive solution F
on [t0;T].
Notice that I did not mention anything about the monotonicity of the solution. There
are two reasons for that. First, as I will show in section 3.7, functions Fi in a solution to
(DE)-(IC) may be non-monotone. Second, it is not clear whether one can ￿nd conditions
on Gi that guarantee the monotonicity of all Fi. Therefore, the monotonicity of a solution
to problem (DE)-(IC) will be assumed.
3.4 Main results
The theorem below formulate the existence result for problem (DE)-(IC).
Theorem 3.4. (Existence of a solution) Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions
(I) and (II). Then problem (DE)-(IC) has a positive solution on [t0;T].
Remember that all conditions on Gi required in this theorem are necessary conditions
implied by the model. Therefore, conditions (I) and (II) are both necessary and su￿cient
conditions for the existence of a solution to the model. In particular, if even one of the
conditions in (I) and (II) fails to hold, we can immediately conclude that the model is not
stated correctly.
The next theorem describes conditions on Gi su￿cient to guarantee the identi￿cation
of Fi.
Theorem 3.5. (Uniqueness of a solution) Let observable functions Gi satisfy condi-
tions (I), (II) and























10is Lebesgue integrable ¡ that is, belongs to the class L1 ¡ in a neighborhood of t0.
Then problem (DE)-(IC) has a unique positive solution on [t0;T].
Because the function in condition (III) is non-negative, Lebesgue integrability means
that the integral of this function is ￿nite.
1
1






Figure 1. Underlying distribution functions.
1￿10
Figure 2. Function in (3.5).
The most important element in obtaining su￿cient condition (III) is the result of Propo-
sition 3.2. To acquire a better understanding of this condition, I write it in terms of
distribution functions Fi.














(F1 + F2 + F3) (3.5)
is Lebesgue integrable in a neighborhood of t0.
Now it is intuitive that the reasoning behind this condition is that the underlying dis-
tribution functions F1, F2 and F3 are not too di￿erent around t0 in a certain sense. For
instance, if the underlying distribution functions are F1 = t, F2 = t and F3 = exp(1 ¡ 1
t2)
11on [0;1], then the corresponding observable functions Gi do not satisfy condition (III). Fig-
ure 1 depicts these distribution functions Fi. As we can see, the value distribution for the
third bidder has a very small mass around point 0, whereas values for the ￿rst and second
bidders are distributed uniformly on [0;1]. This means that bidder 3 wins very rarely when
all the bidders submit bids close to t0. Figure 2 shows the function in (3.5). This function
has the same behavior in a neighborhood of point 0 as the observable function in (3.4). It
is non-integrable because in a neighborhood of 0 it behaves as function 1
t2.
Condition (3.5) is satis￿ed if all Fi behave as power functions around t0:
Fi(t) = O((t ¡ t0)
®i) as t # t0;
where ®i > 0, i = 1;2;3.
In identi￿cation results for the ￿rst-price auctions, it is usually assumed that the den-
sities of all the distributions of the bidders’ values are bounded from zero and are ￿nite
on the support. For example, these conditions are imposed in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong
(2009). Condition (III) is much weaker than these restrictions. Indeed, if the densities







are bounded from above,
which implies that all the rations
Fi
Fj are bounded from above, and hence condition (III) is
obviously satis￿ed.
3.5 Local and global identi￿cation
My identi￿cation proof comprises two major steps: establishing the local identi￿cation
result and the global identi￿cation result. Namely, I ￿rst prove that problem (DE)-(IC)
has only one positive solution F in a small neighborhood of t0; this solution is what I call a
local solution. Establishing the existence and the uniqueness of a local solution is the most
challenging part of the identi￿cation result because problem (DE)-(IC) has a singularity
at t0. Notice that conditions (II) and (III) describe the behavior of observable functions
Gi only in a neighborhood of t0.
After I prove the existence and the uniqueness of a local solution to (DE)-(IC), I show
that it can be extended to a positive solution on the entire interval [t0;T], and that such
extension is unique.
To gain intuition, consider Figure 3. The picture on the left shows the local solution F
found on some interval [t0;t0 + c]. The idea of constructing a global solution is to extend
this solution F to the right at least to a small interval (t0 + c;t0 + c1], c1 > c, in such a
way that the extended solution solves (DE)-(IC) on [t0;t0 + c1]. The picture on the right
in Figure 3 shows this extended solution. Then this solution is extended even farther to
the right and so on. I show that if we continue this process in a certain way, then we will






F1, F2, F3 on [t0;t0 + c]





F1, F2, F3 on [t0;t0 + c1]
Figure 3. Solution to the main problem on [t0;t0 + c] (left) and extended solution to the main
problem on [t0;t0 + c1] (right).
3.6 Generalizations
3.6.1 Any number of bidders
In this section, I show how the identi￿cation result for auctions with three bidders can be
generalized to auctions with any number of bidders. I state main results and outline their
proofs in Appendix A. The interpretations and intuitiveness of these results are similar to
those in the case of three bidders.
The observable functions are




bj < bi); i = 1;:::;d:
Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 below are the analogs of propositions 3.1 and 3.2. Corollary 3.8
is analogous to Corollary 3.3.
Proposition 3.6. If the model is stated correctly, then the following conditions hold:
Necessary conditions (Id)
1. Gi(t0) = 0, i = 1;:::;d
2. Gi are absolutely continuous on [t0;T], i = 1;:::;d
3. Gi are strictly increasing on [t0;T], i = 1;:::;d











(t) = 1; i = 1;:::;d:









(t) = 0; i = 1;:::;d:
The mathematical model of the identi￿cation problem is obtained in the following way.
The de￿nition of Gi and the independence of private values yield the following system of
integral-di￿erential equations that describes relationships between observable functions Gi






(1 ¡ Fi)ds; i = 1;:::;d:
The di￿erentiation of both sides of these equations gives us a system of di￿erential equations
gi = (F1 :::Fi¡1Fi+1 :::Fd)
0
(1 ¡ Fi); i = 1;:::;d: (3.6)
Functions Fi in this system must satisfy initial conditions
Fi(t0) = 0; i = 1;:::;d: (3.7)
Theorem 3.9 below gives necessary and su￿cient conditions for the existence of a solution
to the model. Theorem 3.10 presents an identi￿cation result.
Theorem 3.9. (Existence of a solution) Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions
(Id) and (IId). Then problem (3.6)-(3.7) has a positive solution on [t0;T].
Theorem 3.10. (Uniqueness of a solution) Let observable functions Gi satisfy condi-
tions (Id), (IId) and















is Lebesgue integrable in a neighborhood of t0. Then problem (3.6)-(3.7) has a unique
positive solution on [t0;T].












is Lebesgue integrable in a neighborhood of t0.
143.6.2 Only two types of bidders
Suppose that there are only two types of bidders. Without a loss of generality, bidders
1, ..., k have type I and bidders k + 1, ..., d are of type II. In this case, there are two
observable functions:
GI(t) = Pr(price · t; bidder of type I wins);
GII(t) = Pr(price · t; bidder of type II wins):
Clearly, Gi = GI, i = 1;:::;k, and Gi = GII, i = k + 1;:::;d. The following theorem
gives the conditions on observables that are both necessary and su￿cient for identi￿cation.
It shows that in the situation with only two types, condition (IIId) is not required for
identi￿cation.
Theorem 3.11. If observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (Id), then the distributions of
bidders’ values are identi￿ed. In other words, conditions (Id) are necessary and su￿cient
for identi￿cation.
The result in theorem 3.11 can be extended to the case when bidders’ private values are
dependent and their joint distribution is described by an Archimedean copula:
C(u1;u2;:::;ud) = Ã
¡1 (Ã(u1) + Ã(u2) + ::: + Ã(ud));
where function Ã is de￿ned on (0;1] and
Ã(1) = 0; lim
x!0
Ã(x) = 1; Ã
0(x) < 0; Ã
00(x) > 0:
Theorem 3.12. If observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (Id) and the function
Ã00(x)
(Ã0(x))2
is increasing, then the distributions of bidders’ values are identi￿ed.
This theorem can be applied, for instance, to the following copulas:
Clayton copulas: Ã(x) = 1
µ(x¡µ ¡ 1), µ 2 (0;1).





; µ > 0;
Ã(x) = ¡lnx; µ = 0:
Joe copulas: Ã(x) = ¡ln(1 ¡ (1 ¡ x)µ), µ 2 [1;1).
Ali-Mikhail-Haq (AMH) copulas: Ã(x) = ln
1+µ(1¡x)¡µ
x ; µ 2 (¡1;0].
15Identi￿cation within the Archimedean family of copulas in a di￿erent auction framework
is considered in Brendstrup and Paarsch (2007).
3.6.3 Weaker support conditions
The assumption that bidders’ values have the same support can be relaxed. For instance,
bidders can have di￿erent upper support point or holes in their supports, but the assump-
tion that has to be maintained is that bidders’ values have the same lower support point.
This result is explained by the fact that in the identi￿cation proof, I ￿rst established the
existence and uniqueness of a local solution and then extended it to the whole support.
I start by considering a case of three bidders and analyzing identi￿cation when their
distributions’ upper support points di￿er from each other. I then generalize this analysis
for auctions with any number of bidders. Finally, I brie￿y discuss what happens when
distributions have holes in their supports.
Auctions with three bidders
Let ¿1, ¿2, ¿3 be the upper support points of the distributions of bidders’ valuations.
Without a loss of generality, assume that ¿1 · ¿2 · ¿3. Given these inequalities, there
are four possibilities for the locations of ¿1, ¿2, ¿3 with respect to each other; they are
illustrated in ￿gures 4 and 5.
Case 1: ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿3
This is the case analyzed in this paper. Clearly, functions Gi are de￿ned on [t0;¿1] and
satisfy the boundary condition
G1(¿1) + G2(¿1) + G3(¿1) = 1
because G1(¿1) + G2(¿1) + G3(¿1) = Pr(price · ¿1) = 1. As I have already established,
given G1, G2 and G3, distribution functions F1, F2 and F3 are identi￿ed on [t0;¿1]. This
case is illustrated in ￿gure 4.
Case 2: ¿1 < ¿2 = ¿3
Because the ￿rst player never submits bids higher than ¿1, function G1 is de￿ned on [t0;¿1].
The second and the third players have positive probability of submitting bids in [¿1;¿2], so
G2 and G3 are de￿ned on [t0;¿2]. The de￿nitions of G1, G2 and G3 imply the boundary
condition
G1(¿1) + G2(¿2) + G3(¿2) = 1:
Identi￿cation is obtained in the following way. On [t0;¿1], functions Fi must solve (DE)-
(IC). First, I ￿nd the unique solution to (DE)-(IC) in a small neighborhood of t0. I then
use methods from section 7.4.2 in Appendix A to extend it farther to the right until one
of the functions F1, F2, F3 reaches value 1. Because by assumption ¿1 < ¿2 = ¿3, function
F1 will be the ￿rst one to reach value 1, and that will happen at ¿1. Thus, all Fi can be
16identi￿ed on [t0;¿1], and I can ￿nd values x2 = F2(¿1) > 0 and x3 = F3(¿1) > 0. The next
step is to identify functions F2 and F3 on (¿1;¿2]. On this interval, functions F2 and F3
must solve the system
g2 = F
0




and satisfy initial conditions
F2(¿1) = x2; F3(¿1) = x3:
Applying techniques from section 7.4.1 in Appendix A, I can show that this problem has
the unique solution in a right-hand neighborhood of ¿1. Employing extension methods, I
can demonstrate that this local solution can be extended to the interval [¿1;¿2] and that
such extension is unique.2 This case is illustrated in ￿gure 5.
Case 3: ¿1 = ¿2 < ¿3
In this case, there are no observable data on (¿1;¿3]. So, functions Gi are de￿ned on [t0;¿1]
and satisfy the boundary condition
G1(¿1) + G2(¿1) + G3(¿1) = 1:
Given G1, G2 and G3, I ￿nd the unique solution F to (DE)-(IC) on [t0;¿1]. Hence, F1
and F2 are identi￿ed. As for F3, nothing can be learned about this function for t > ¿1
because there are no observations corresponding to those t, so this function is only partially
identi￿ed. This case is illustrated in ￿gure 4.
Case 4: ¿1 < ¿2 < ¿3
This situation is similar to case 3. Function G1 is de￿ned on [t0;¿1], G2 is de￿ned on [t0;¿2],
and because a transaction price never exceeds ¿2, G3 is de￿ned only on [t0;¿2]. Functions
G1, G2 and G3 satisfy the boundary condition
G1(¿1) + G2(¿2) + G3(¿2) = 1:
To identify F1 and F2 as well as partially identify F3, I proceed as follows. On [t0;¿1],
functions F1, F2 and F3 must solve problem (DE)-(IC). On [¿1;¿2], functions F2 and F3
must solve system (3.8) and satisfy certain initial conditions at ¿1. Therefore, F1 and F2
are identi￿ed. Because there are no observed data for t > ¿2, function F3 cannot be learned
2The methodology presented here can be used for auctions with any number of bidders. In this particular









1¡G2¡G3. This system has a closed-form solution: F2(t) =









17for t > ¿2; that is, F3 is only partially identi￿ed. This case is illustrated in ￿gure 5.
Thus, in auctions with three bidders, two distribution functions F1 and F2 are always
identi￿ed. In two cases, the third distribution function F3 is identi￿ed too. In two other
cases, it is identi￿ed only on a subinterval of the corresponding support.
Auctions with any number of bidders
Now I consider auctions with any number of bidders and brie￿y discuss identi￿cation in
this case. Suppose I found the unique local solution to (DE)-(IC). I extend it farther and
farther to the right until I reach a point where one of the functions Fi hits the value of 1.
Beyond this point, system (DE) does not contain the equation corresponding to bidder i.
Thus, d ¡ 1 equations (or possibly even fewer equations, if several functions Fi hit value
1 at the same point) remain in system (DE). Next, I ￿nd the unique local solution to
the reduced system and extend this solution to the right until I reach a point where one
of the remaining functions Fi hits value 1. Beyond this point, the number of equations in
the system decreases again. Proceeding in this way, I eventually come to a ￿nal system
such that all functions Fi in its solution, with the possible exception of one function, reach
value 1 at the same point.
The result of the next proposition is intuitive from case of the three bidders. I do not
prove this result because it follows from the local existence and local uniqueness results,
as well as the extension techniques.
Proposition 3.13. Suppose that d bidders are participating in the auction, and the dis-
tributions of their values are locally identi￿ed. Let [t0;¿i] stand for the support of bidder i,
i = 1;:::;d. Without a loss of generality, assume that
¿1 · ¿2 · ::: · ¿d¡1 · ¿d:
If ¿d¡1 = ¿d, then all distribution functions F1, ..., Fd are identi￿ed. If ¿d¡1 < ¿d, then
d ¡ 1 functions F1,..., Fd¡1 are identi￿ed, and Fd is identi￿ed only on [t0;¿d¡1].
Holes in the support
Finally, I want to informally discuss identi￿cation in a situation where the distributions
of bidders’ values can have holes in the supports. In this case, distribution functions Fi can
have intervals on which they are constant. If all distributions have the same lower support
point t0, then Fi(t) > 0 for t > t0 and therefore local identi￿cation can be shown by using
techniques from section 7.3. Extension to the global solution depends on distributions’
upper support points, as explained in Proposition 3.13.
3.6.4 Reserve price
The case of a reserve price is considered in Athey and Haile (2006) . The authors state
that the distributions of bidders’ values are identi￿ed for t ¸ r when the transaction price,






























Figure 4. Supports for cases 1 and 3
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20the identity of the winning bidder, and the set of actual bidders are observable. Below I
brie￿y explain why this is so.
Suppose that the seller sets a reserve price of r. In second-price auctions with pri-
vate values, a reserve price does not change bidders’ behavior because it is still a weakly
dominant strategy to bid one’s value.
Assume that the reserve price is known to the bidders, and that a bidder does not submit
a bid if her value lies below the reserve price. Also suppose that r lies in the intersection
of the supports of all bidders3 and in any right-hand side neighborhood of r, densities F 0
i
are positive on sets that have positive Lebesgue measure.




; t ¸ r:
Because for bidder i the probability of the event fall bidders participate, i winsg is positive,
then all the truncated distribution functions can be identi￿ed from the system
gi = ( ¹ F1 ::: ¹ Fi¡1 ¹ Fi+1 ::: ¹ Fd)
0
(1 ¡ ¹ Fi); i = 1;:::;d;
with the initial conditions
¹ Fi(r) = 0; i = 1;:::;d:
Here gi is the derivative of the following function Gi:
Gi(t) = Pr(r · price · t; i wins);
and it is assumed that su￿cient conditions for identi￿cation are satis￿ed.
Note that the values Fi(r) are identi￿ed for each i because
Fi(r) = P(i does not participate in the auction);
and the probability of this event is known due to the assumption that the set of actual
bidders is observed.
The identi￿cation of the truncated distributions functions for t ¸ r and the identi￿cation
of the values Fi(r) imply that distributions functions Fi are identi￿ed for t ¸ r.
3.6.5 Auctions with stochastic number of bidders
In this section, I assume that the number of potential buyers is known and does not change,
but the number of actual bidders is unknown and varies exogenously. For instance, this
may happen because of entrance fees or the di￿erent costs of acquiring information. In this
3We can allow bidders to have di￿erent lower support points.
21setting, I do not aim to present a complete analysis of identi￿cation in general. Rather,
I want to illustrate how the methods developed in this paper allow us to approach the
identi￿cation problem. To gain some insight while keeping the problem simple, I consider
the case of three buyers.
Suppose that the number of bidders and their identities are determined by chance and
the process through which bidders are selected is taken to be exogenous, embodied in
probabilities pA, A ½ f1;2;3g. I assume that at least two bidders are participating in the
auction:
p12 + p13 + p23 + p123 = 1;
and each buyer has a positive probability of participation:
X
j6=i
pij + p123 > 0; i = 1;2;3:
Suppose that buyers’ private values are absolutely continuous and distributed on a
common support [t0;T]. As before, assume that the available data tells us the winner’s
identity and the transaction price, and therefore we observe functions Gi(t) = Pr(price ·
t; i wins), i = 1;2;3. Using the law of total probability, it can be found that
G1(t) = P( price · t;1 wins jf1;2g)p12 + P( price · t;1 wins jf1;3g)p13





















































To prove identi￿cation, I have to show that system (3.9) with initial conditions
F(t0) = 0; i = 1;2;3; (3.10)
has a unique positive solution on [t0;T]. My approach is to construct an auxiliary system
22by introducing new functions
H1 = p12F2 + p13F3 + p123F2F3;
H2 = p12F1 + p23F3 + p123F1F3;
H3 = p13F1 + p23F2 + p123F1F2:
Below I demonstrate that, in general, functions Fi have a unique representation in terms
of Hi. Let qi(H) denote the representation of Fi in terms of H. Then (3.9) can be written






; i = 1;2;3:
The initial conditions on Hi are
lim
t#t0
Hi(t) = 0; i = 1;2;3:
The existence of a local solution to the auxiliary problem can be proved by applying
techniques from section 7.3. First, I would ￿nd necessary conditions on Gi. Assuming these
conditions I would use the Tonelli approximations method to prove the local existence of a
solution H to the auxiliary problem. Then, I would ￿nd a solution F to (3.9)-(3.10) from
H by using formulas Fi = qi(H), i = 1;2;3. The extension techniques in section 7.4 would
be used to show global identi￿cation.
Now I demonstrate that Fi have unique representations through Hi. I consider two
cases: one with p12 > 0, p13 > 0, p23 > 0, p123 > 0, and the other where p12 > 0, p13 > 0,
p23 > 0, p123 = 0. In both cases, the only conditions required for uniqueness are gi 2 L1 in
a small neighborhood of t0; these conditions are obviously satis￿ed. Note that the example
in which p123 = 1 constitutes the paper’s original problem.




































































(p123H1 + p12p13)(p123H2 + p12p23)
p123H3 + p13p23
:
The expressions on the right-hand sides of these equations are q1(H), q2(H) and q3(H),
respectively.
Case p12 > 0, p13 > 0, p23 > 0, p123 = 0
Because
H1 = p12F2 + p13F3
H2 = p12F1 + p23F3
H3 = p13F1 + p23F2;






































































The expressions on the right-hand sides of these equations are q1(H), q2(H) and q3(H),
respectively. As we can see, in both cases Fi are uniquely expressed in terms of Hi.
Several papers have explored other types of auctions with exogenous variation in the
number of bidders. For instance, McAfee and McMillan (1987) allow the number of actual
24bidders to be stochastic in ￿rst-price, sealed-bid auctions with independent private values.
They investigate how bidders’ uncertainty about the number of actual rivals a￿ects their
equilibrium behavior, not to mention the seller’s expected revenue and other issues. In
another study, Harstad, Kagel and Levin (1990) consider symmetric ￿rst-price and second-
price auctions with an uncertain number of actual bidders. They show that ￿rst-price and
second-price auctions, each with the number of bidders known or uncertain, and English
auctions are revenue-equivalent.
3.7 Non-monotonicity of the solution
Conditions (I), (II) and (III) guarantee that problem (DE)-(IC) has a unique positive
solution. However, it is possible that functions in this solution are not all increasing. In
this situation, one can conclude that the auction model is not stated correctly.
The example below describes a system of well-de￿ned functions Gi such that one of
functions Fi in the corresponding unique solution is not monotone.
Example 3.1. This example is illustrated in Figure 6. On [0;1] consider F2(t) = t,





¡2t + 2¡2m+1; t 2 [2¡2m¡2;2¡2m¡1]; m ¸ 1;
10t ¡ 2¡2m+2; t 2 [2¡2m¡1;2¡2m]; m ¸ 2;
(6t + 1)=7; t 2 [1=8;1]:
Function F1 has the Lipschitz property and therefore it is absolutely continuous. It is
strictly decreasing on intervals [2¡2m¡2;2¡2m¡1], m ¸ 1, and strictly increasing on other
intervals. In particular, F1 is not increasing in any small neighborhood of t0.
I now demonstrate that functions F2F3, F1F3 and F1F2 are strictly increasing. Clearly,







Function t(¡2t + 2¡2m+1) is quadratic; it strictly increases until point 2¡2m¡1, then it
strictly decreases. So, F1F3 is strictly increasing on [2¡2m¡2;2¡2m¡1].






Quadratic function t(10t ¡ 2¡2m+2) strictly decreases until point 2¡2m=5 and strictly in-
creases afterward. Because 2¡2m¡1 > 2¡2m=5, then F1F3 strictly increases on [2¡2m¡1;2¡2m].
Obviously, on [1=8;1] function
F1F3(t) = t(6t + 1)=7
25strictly increases. Thus, F1F3 and, consequently, F1F2 are strictly increasing on [0;1].
Now ￿nd functions Gi according to integral-di￿erential equations (3.3). Because F1F2,
F1F3 and F2F3 are strictly increasing, functions Gi are strictly increasing as well. These Gi
clearly satisfy other conditions in (I) and also condition (II). It can be shown that Fi satisfy
condition (3.5) and, therefore, Gi satisfy the main identi￿cation condition (III). Hence, we























Figure 6. F1, F2, F3 on [0;1=8] (Example 3.1).
The last thing that has to be to shown is that functions Gi in this example can indeed
be observed in auction’s outcomes. To do this, I present an example of a joint absolutely
continuous distribution that rationalizes Gi. Find functions ©i, ªi, ¥i, i = 1;2;3, that
satisfy the following conditions:
1. They are de￿ned on [0;1], positive, increasing and absolutely continuous on [0;1].

















Denote Ái = ©0
i, Ãi = ª0
i and »i = ¥0
i. Consider the following function de￿ned on [0;1]3:
f(x1;x2;x3) = Á1(x1)Á2(x2)Á3(x3)1(x1 ¸ x2)1(x1 ¸ x3)
+ Ã1(x1)Ã2(x2)Ã3(x3)1(x2 > x1)1(x2 ¸ x3)
+ »1(x1)»2(x2)»3(x3)1(x3 > x1)1(x3 > x2):
26Function f is an example of the joint density of the distribution of bidders’ values that
rationalizes observable Gi. Note that because we can choose functions ©i, ªi, ¥i in many
di￿erent ways, there are many observationally equivalent densities of this type.
This non-monotonicity result is possible because of the complexity of auction data.
Indeed, in auctions with d bidders, data provide direct knowledge regarding groups of d¡1
bidders. To learn each bidder’s value separately, this information has to be disentangled
further.
It is important to mention that non-monotonicity is su￿cient but not necessary for de-
tecting an incorrectly stated model. That is, considering such models under the assumption
of independence, it is possible to obtain a solution in which all functions are distribution
functions.
The non-monotonicity result carries important implications for generalized competing
risks models and contrasts sharply with results for classical competing risks models. In
classical models (Roy model), every dependent risks model has a unique, observationally
equivalent independent risks model, as shown in Tsiatis (1975). Example 3.1 shows that in
generalized competing risks models this is not necessarily so because the non-monotonicity
of at least one function Fi means that the risks are dependent. In other words, in general-
ized competing risks models, in some situations dependent and independent risks can be
distinguished nonparametrically.
In auctions, the non-monotonicity of Fi can occur for a variety of reasons. For instance,
it can happen if bidders’ private values are not independent, or if bidders do not behave
rationally, or if bidders’ values are not private.
4 Sieve estimation of distribution functions
This section presents an approach to estimating the distribution functions of private values
from a random sample. First, I de￿ne an operator A that maps unknown distribution
functions F1, F2, F3 to observable functions G1, G2, G3. I show that this operator is
Lipschitz and that under weak conditions on the set of F = (F1;F2;F3), its inverse operator
A¡1 is continuous. I then derive sieve estimators of Fi and use the properties of A to show
their consistency.
274.1 Operator A




















Let ¤ be the set of functions F = (F1;F2;F3)tr de￿ned on [t0;T] and satisfying the following
conditions:
Conditions CI.
1. Fi are absolutely continuous on [t0;T].
2. Fi are strictly increasing on [t0;T].
3. Fi(t0) = 0, Fi(T) = 1, i = 1;2;3.













(F1 + F2 + F3)
is Lebesgue integrable in a neighborhood of t0.
Let A be de￿ned on ¤. Properties of the image A(¤) are described in Proposition 3.1:
Gi are absolutely continuous on [t0;T], strictly increasing on [t0;T] and Gi(t0) = 0. Also,
G1(T) + G2(T) + G3(T) = 1. As shown in this paper, there exists the inverse operator
A¡1 : A(¤) ! ¤.
Endow both domain ¤ and its image A(¤) with the following uniform metric:
d(F; ~ F) = sup
t2[0;1]
q
(F(t) ¡ ~ F(t))tr(F(t) ¡ ~ F(t))
d(G; ~ G) = sup
t2[0;1]
q
(G(t) ¡ ~ G(t))tr(G(t) ¡ ~ G(t)):
The proposition below implies that A is continuous in this metric.
Proposition 4.1. For any F; ~ F 2 ¤,
d(A(F);A( ~ F)) · 9
p
3d(F; ~ F);
that is, operator A is Lipschitz on ¤.
28The properties of A are important for proving the consistency of the estimators of Fi.
Usually, it is easier to establish consistency when the space of functions is compact. I





0(t) a:e: [t0;T]; i = 1;2;3;
where Á is some absolutely continuous function on [t0;T].
Let ¤Á be a subset of ¤ such that all functions F from ¤Á satisfy condition CII. This
condition guarantees that ¤Á is relatively compact under the uniform metric. Indeed, for
any F 2 ¤Á and t;¿ 2 [t0;T],













¯ · jÁ(t) ¡ Á(¿)j; i = 1;2;3:
Because Á is absolutely continuous, the last inequality implies that the set ¤Á is equicontin-
uous. It is also uniformly bounded because the values of Fi do not exceed 1. According to
the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, ¤Á is relatively compact in metric d(¢;¢). Note that if F 2 ¤Á,
then function G = A(F) satis￿es this condition too:
gi(t) · Á
0(t) a:e: [t0;T]; i = 1;2;3:
Let ¤Á stand for the closure of ¤Á under metric d(¢;¢). Because ¤Á is relatively compact,
¤Á is a compact set. To consider operator A on ¤Á, I ￿rst have to show that A is de￿ned
for functions in this set that do not belong to ¤Á. The proposition below establishes that
all functions in ¤Á satisfy conditions 1, 3 and a modi￿ed condition 2 in CI, and also satisfy
condition CII.
Proposition 4.2. If F = (F1;F2;F3)tr 2 ¤Á, then functions Fi are absolutely continuous,
increasing and satisfy Fi(t0) = 0. Also, F 0
i(t) · Á0(t) a.e. on [t0;T], i = 1;2;3.
Because all functions in ¤Á are absolutely continuous, operator A can be extended from
¤Á to ¤Á. The next proposition implies that A is continuous on ¤Á.
Proposition 4.3. For any F; ~ F 2 ¤Á,
d(A(F);A( ~ F)) · C0d(F; ~ F); (4.1)
where C0 = 3
p
3(1 + 3Á(T) ¡ 3Á(t0)); that is, A is Lipschitz on ¤Á.
Finally, I establish the continuity of A¡1 on A(¤Á).
Proposition 4.4. A¡1 is continuous on A(¤Á).
This proposition follows from the fact that if a continuous operator is de￿ned on a
compact set and the inverse operator is de￿ned on the image of that set, then the inverse
29operator is continuous. The inverse operator A¡1 is clearly de￿ned on A(¤Á) but I have
not shown that it is de￿ned on the set A(¤Á). However, this does not a￿ect the result (see
explanation in Appendix 8).
4.2 Consistent estimation
In this section, I de￿ne sieve estimators of the distribution functions Fi and prove their
consistency.
Without a loss of generality, assume that the distributions have support [0;1]. Denote
the true distribution functions as F ¤
i and the corresponding observable functions as G¤
i.
That is, G¤ = A(F ¤), where F ¤ = (F ¤
1;F ¤
2;F ¤
3)tr and G¤ = (G¤
1;G¤
2;G¤
3)tr. Let F ¤ 2 ¤Á.
The next lemma introduces a function Q on ¤Á that is uniquely minimized by F ¤.






The idea of sieve estimation is to use a sample analog of Q and approximate ¤Á with
￿nite-dimensional spaces. For each k, choose base functions p1;k;:::;pm(k);k (for example,
B-splines with uniform knots or Bernstein polynomials) and introduce the set of linear
combinations of these functions:
Mk = f(F1;F2;F3)





lpl;k(t); t 2 [0;1]g:
In this set of functions, consider only those functions that are in ¤Á:
§k = ¤Á \ Mk:
Set §k consists of functions from Mk with certain restrictions on coe￿cients ®i
l. It is
relatively compact and, hence, its closure §k is compact, and §k ½ ¤Á.
Consider a random sample of n observations (ti;wi)n
i=1, where ti is the observed price
and wi is the winner’s identity in i’s auction. Without a loss of generality, assume that
ti < ti+1, i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1. From the sample, ￿nd consistent estimators ^ Gi;n of Gi, for
instance, analogs of empirical distribution functions.






( ^ Gn(ti) ¡ A(F)(ti))
tr( ^ Gn(ti) ¡ A(F)(ti)):
30Also let k = k(n), and de￿ne the following estimator of F ¤:
^ Fn = argminF2§k(n)
^ Qn(F):
The theorem below establishes the estimator consistency when sets §k well approximate
set ¤Á.
Theorem 4.6. If
8(F 2 ¤Á)9( ~ F 2 §k) d(F; ~ F)
p
! 0 as k ! 1; (4.2)




! 0 as n ! 1:
Condition (4.2) holds if approximating sets are chosen properly ¡ for instance, if base
functions p1;k;:::;pm(k);k are B-splines with uniform knots, Bernstein polynomials or trun-
cated power series.
5 Identi￿cation in generalized competing risks models
The main purpose of this section is to present conditions on observables su￿cient to guar-
antee identi￿cation in generalized competing risks models.
In section 2, I gave two examples of these models. First, I explained why we can
consider second-price auctions to be a special case of these models. In the other example, I
considered widely used classical competing risks models. I now proceed to a more detailed
description of generalized competing risks models. For convenience, I use the terminology of
reliability theory, which refers to these generalized models as coherent systems.4 Essentially,
a coherent system is a system that collapses because several of its elements fail.
Suppose that a machine with a coherent structure consists of d elements. Denote the
elements’ lifetimes as X1,...,Xd and the machine’s lifetime as Z; the lifetime Z is a function
of X1,..., Xd. Conveniently, Z can be characterized by fatal sets. As de￿ned in section 2,
a fatal set is a subset of parts such that the failure of all the parts in the subset causes the
failure of the machine. Even more conveniently, Z can be characterized by the collection
I1, ..., Im of minimal fatal sets, which are fatal sets that do not encompass other fatal
sets.
The examples below clarify the structure of a coherent system. To guarantee that the
probability of the simultaneous failure of several elements is 0, I suppose that the joint
distribution of X1,..., Xd is absolutely continuous. Also, Xi have the same support [t0;T].
4The concept of a coherent system was introduced in Barlow and Proschan (1975).
31Example 5.1. In a classical competing risks model with d risks, the collection of minimal
fatal sets is I1 = f1g, ..., Id = fdg, and the machine’s lifetime is
Z = minfX1;:::;Xdg:
Clearly, the number of minimal fatal sets coincides with the number of elements. Further-
more, there are no fatal sets other than sets Ii. Take, for instance, set f1;2g. Although it
is a superset of fatal sets f1g and f2g, it is not fatal itself. Indeed, the death of these two
elements could not cause the machine’s failure because the death of either of them would
have led to failure earlier.
Example 5.2. Consider a button auction with d bidders who have private values. In this
case, the fatal sets are the sets of bidders who dropped out before the auction ended. The
collection of minimal fatal sets is
Ii = f1;:::;i ¡ 1;i + 1;:::;dg; i = 1;:::;d:
Here, element lifetimes Xi are bidders’ private values, and the lifetime Z is the winning
price. Notice that the number of minimal fatal sets is the same as the number of bidders,
and there are no fatal sets besides Ii.
Example 5.3. Consider a machine with ￿ve parts. Let the collection of minimal fatal
sets be I1 = f1;2;3g, I2 = f1;2;4g, I3 = f1;3;4g, I4 = f2;3;4g, I5 = f1;3;5g and
I6 = f2;3;5g. An example of a fatal set that is not a minimal fatal set is f1;2;3;5g:
It causes the failure of the machine when, for instance, the machine’s elements break in
the order of 5, 1, 2 and 3. Set f1;2;3;4g, on the other hand, is not fatal because all its
three-element subsets are minimal fatal sets.
For coherent systems, the goal is to learn the marginal distributions of element lifetimes
Xi from the joint distribution of observed "autopsy" data, which comprise the machine’s
lifetime Z and a fatal set I that is responsible for the machine’s failure. This identi￿cation
question is raised in Meilijson (1981). Meilijson claims that, under certain restrictions on
a coherent system’s structure, the distributions of the components’ lifetimes are identi￿ed
if the lifetimes are independent. To formulate the identi￿cation result, he introduces an
incidence matrix constructed in the following way. Given a collection of minimal fatal sets,
the coherent system’s incidence matrix is a matrix M such that M(i;j) = 1 if j 2 Ii, and
M(i;j) = 0 otherwise, i = 1;:::;m, j = 1;:::;d.












32In classical competing risks models, on the other hand, the incidence matrix is the d £ d
identity matrix.
The main result of Meilijson (1981) says that if X1, X2, ..., Xd are non-atomic and
independent and possess the same essential in￿mum and supremum, and if the rank of M
is d, then the joint distribution of Z and I uniquely determines the distribution of each
Xj, j = 1;:::;d.
The idea behind Meilijson’s proof is (a) to use data only from those cases where set I is a
minimal fatal set and (b) to obtain integral equations that relate the distribution functions
of components’ lifetimes to observable functions, and then apply to them a ￿xed point
theorem for multidimensional functional spaces. Though Meilijson (1981) made impor-
tant contributions, including the observation that only the data corresponding to minimal
fatal sets can be considered, as well as and the rank condition on the incidence matrix,
the proofs lack some essential details. First, the author does not discuss necessary condi-
tions on observable data besides mentioning them as a prospect for future research. As
we have seen in the auction model, however, such conditions are crucial for obtaining the
existence and uniqueness result. Second, he does not explore the existence of underly-
ing distributions that rationalize the observables. A possible reason for this omission is
the fact that in the majority of generalized competing risks models, existence cannot be
proved and must be assumed, as I explain below. Nevertheless, I show that existence can
be established for a special class of competing risks models, and I present conditions on ob-
servables that are necessary and su￿cient for existence. Another important piece missing
from Meilijson’s proof is conditions on observables su￿cient to guarantee the uniqueness
of underlying distributions consistent with the data. I provide these conditions for any
generalized competing risks model. Finally, although the author mentions that the locally
identi￿ed distribution functions can be extended to the whole support, he does not present
a proof of this result. As in the auction, such a proof would require the identi￿cation result
for the case in which all distribution functions have positive values at the initial point.
I suggest a new approach to identi￿cation in generalized competing risks models that
o￿ers a complete transparent proof of the identi￿cation result. I assume that the com-
ponents’ lifetimes have absolutely continuous distributions, even though Meilijson (1981)
obtains his result under the weaker assumption that the lifetimes’ distributions are merely
continuous. The idea behind my method is similar to the case of the auction; namely, I
derive a system of non-linear di￿erential equations that relates the underlying distribution
functions to observable functions, then examine the existence and uniqueness issues for this
system. I use the incidence matrix and assume the rank condition as in Meilijson (1981).
Now I turn to stating the main results for generalized competing risks models. An
outline of Meilijson’s method are in Appendix B.
33For any fatal set D, there is a corresponding observable function GD:
GD(t) = P(Z · t;D causes machine’s failure):














where Fj is the distribution function of Xj, CD is the intersection of all minimal fatal sets
contained in D, and Dc = f1;:::;dgnD.











(1 ¡ Fj(s))ds; i = 1;:::;m: (5.2)
System (5.2) of integral-di￿erential equations is an analog of system (3.3). The di￿er-










; i = 1;:::;m: (5.3)
I analyze this system together with initial conditions
Fi(t0) = 0; i = 1;:::;d: (5.4)
First, I consider the case in which the number of minimal fatal sets coincides with the
number of the machine’s components ¡ that is m = d. In this instance, the matrix M is
quadratic. Let kij stand for the (i;j) element of the inverse matrix M¡1.
In the next theorem I formulate the existence result for problem (5.3)-(5.4) and describe
conditions on Gi that guarantee it.
Theorem 5.1. 5 Let m = d. Let functions Gi satisfy the following conditions:
1. Gi(t0) = 0, i = 1;:::;d
2. Gi are absolutely continuous on [t0;T], i = 1;:::;d





j (t) = 0, i = 1;:::;d
Then problem (5.3)-(5.4) has a solution F on [t0;T].6
Notice that, from the model, conditions 1-4 in this proposition are necessary on Gi.
Indeed, 1-3 follow directly from the de￿nition of functions Gi. Given that conditions 1-3
5The proof of this theorem is available upon request.
6I consider only positive solutions.
34hold, condition 4 can be obtained from (5.3). The interpretation of these conditions is
similar to that of conditions (I) and (II) in the auction model.
An important di￿erence between this case and the auction, however, is that even if
problem (5.3)-(5.4) possesses a solution F and all Fi in this solution have the properties of
distribution functions, the existence of a solution to the model is not guaranteed. Indeed, to
satisfy the model, F must solve equation (5.1) for any fatal set D. System (5.3), however,
accounts only for the minimal fatal sets. Therefore, after ￿nding a solution to (5.3)-(5.4),
we have to substitute it into (5.1) to verify that it solves this equation for any D. Because
it is di￿cult (and perhaps impossible) to ￿nd conditions on functions GD under which the
model has a solution, it is common in reliability theory to assume existence. The only
situation in which the conditions in Theorem 5.1 guarantee existence of a solution to the
model is when m = d and the only fatal sets in the model are minimal fatal sets. Notice
that this is the case in the auction model analyzed in this paper.
The next theorem provides conditions on Gi that are su￿cient for the uniqueness of a
solution to (5.3)-(5.4). The proof of this theorem is in Appendix B.
















If for any i = 1;:::;d, function
¡i is Lebesgue integrable in a small neighborhood of t0; (5.5)
then problem (5.3)-(5.4) has a unique solution on [t0;T].
Because problem (5.3)-(5.4) has a unique solution, the model cannot have more than
one solution. Therefore, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 5.3. Let m = d. Suppose that all conditions in Theorem 5.2 are satis￿ed. Then
a solution to the model, if it exists, is unique.
When the number of minimal fatal sets exceeds d ¡ that is, m > d ¡ the existence
of a solution to the model is always assumed. It is easy, however, to indicate conditions
on observable functions that guarantee the uniqueness of a solution to the model when
one exists. Consider any d £ d full-rank submatrix of M. Without a loss of generality,
suppose that this submatrix is formed by the ￿rst d rows in M. The subsystem of (5.3) that
comprises the di￿erential equations corresponding to the ￿rst d rows in M has only one
solution if Gi satisfy the conditions in Theorem 5.2. Consequently, the model has at most
one solution. We can ￿nd other su￿cient conditions by choosing di￿erent submatrices of
M.
35The proofs of theorems 5.1 and 5.2 use the same methods as those of theorems 3.4 and
3.5. First, the existence and uniqueness of a solution are established locally, then globally.
6 Values are not independent
The main goal of this section is to investigate the identi￿cation issue in second-price auc-
tions in the absence of independence. Many of the results obtained here can be extended
to dependent generalized competing risks models.
For a￿liated private values, Athey and Haile (2002) show that when only a subset
of bids is observed, the joint distribution of bidders’ values is not identi￿ed without any
additional assumptions. In particular, even if all the bids except for the highest bid are
known, there are many distributions consistent with the data.
Even though the distribution of values is not identi￿ed, the data are informative and
allow ￿nding bounds on distributions. These bounds can exploited in the analysis of
counterfactuals and other applications.
Because the auction problem is related to generalized competing risks models, I start
by reviewing the competing risks literature regarding partial identi￿cation. The study of
partial identi￿cation in classical competing risks models was initiated by Peterson (1976),
who obtained tight point-wise bounds on the joint and marginal survival functions. Crow-
der (1991) and Bedford and Meilijson (1997) obtained new results on bounds for those
functions. We also can look to Manski (1990), who examined partial identi￿cation for self-
selection models, of which competing risks models are a subset. For generalized competing
risks models, several results for bounds on survival functions are established by Deshpande
and Karia (1997).
I consider two observational schemes in auctions. The ￿rst scheme is the case when
only the winner’s identity and the transaction price are observed. For this scheme, I
derive bounds on the joint distribution of values for any subset of bidders. It is of interest
to analyze how these bounds change when more data become available ¡ data on other
identities or other bids. That is why I consider the second scheme, which is the situation
when all the identities and all the bids except for the highest bid are known. This situation
corresponds to continuous monitoring models for coherent systems. For this scheme, I
present bounds on the joint distribution of values for the set of all bidders and bounds on
the marginal distributions. All the bounds are derived for any type of dependence, not
only when private values are a￿liated.
Notation
Throughout this section it is supposed that d bidders are participating in a second-price
auction, and their private values X1, ..., Xd have continuous marginal distributions on
the same support [t0;T]. It is also assumed that P(Xi = Xj) = 0, i 6= j, so that the
36probability of a tie is 0. Instead, it can be assumed that the joint distribution of bidders’
values is absolutely continuous, which implies zero probabilities of ties.
Suppose that D = fi1;:::;irg is a subset that consists of bidders i1;:::;ir. De￿ne QD
as the distribution function of valuations of bidders in this subset:
QD(ti1;:::;tir) = P(Xi1 · ti1;:::;Xir · tir):
For D = f1;:::;dg, I denote QD as Q. For D = f1;:::;m¡1;m+1;:::;dg, I denote QD
as Q¡m. For D = fjg, QD is denoted as Fj.
6.1 Bounds when only the winner’s identity and the winning price
are observed
To obtain the lower bound on QD, I use the fact that if bidder j = 2 D = fi1;:::;irg wins
and the price does not exceed t, then all the values Xi1;:::;Xir do not exceed t either.
In other words, functions Gj, j = 2 D, provide information about the lower bound on QD.
On the other hand, if bidder ik wins, then it is not known how large the value Xik is and,
consequently, Gik is not helpful in ￿nding the lower bound on QD.
To obtain the upper bound on QD, I exploit the fact that if we know an upper bound
on value Xik, then we know an upper bound on the price when bidder ik wins. If we know
upper bounds on values Xi1;:::;Xir, and bidder j = 2 D = fi1;:::;irg wins, then in general
no conclusion can be made about the price. In other words, only functions Gi1;:::;Gir
determine the upper bound on QD.
The theorem below formalizes this discussion and presents bounds on distribution func-
tions QD.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose that bidders play their weakly dominant strategy by submitting
their true values. Also suppose that only the winner’s identity and the transaction price
are observed.














































Theorem 6.1 relies on the fact that bidders submit their true values. However, this
condition can be relaxed. Consider the following two assumptions.
Assumption I (AI). Bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay.
Assumption II (AII). Bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are
willing to beat.
These assumptions were introduced in Haile and Tamer (2003). The authors were among
the ￿rst ones to relax equilibrium conditions and allow other types of bidders’ behavior.
One of their contributions is the construction of bounds on distributions for this limited
structure in certain auction models.
The proposition below shows that the bounds in theorem 6.1 are correct when the
equilibrium condition is replaced with assumptions 1 and 2. In addition, I have to assume
that the probability of a tie is 0.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose that only the winner’s identity and the transaction price are
observed and P(bi = bj) = 0 for i 6= j.
(a) If AI holds, then QD are bounded from above as in theorem 6.1.
(b) If AII holds, then QD are bounded from below as in theorem 6.1.
6.2 Bounds when all the identities and all the bids except for the
highest bid are observed
Let ¦d denote the set of all the permutations of set f1;:::;dg and ½ 2 ¦d. Let ½(i) stand
for the ith element of permutation ½. In the auction context, bidder ½(i) is the ith highest
bidder.
The following d! functions are observed:






38Also introduce the following d(d ¡ 1) functions:
Gjh(t) = P( max
i6=j;i6=h






Value Gjh(t) is the probability that bidder j wins, bidder h submits the second-highest bid
and this bid does not exceed t.
For simplicity, I show bounds only on the joint distribution function Q and marginal
distribution functions Fj, j = 1;:::;d.
Theorem 6.3. Suppose that bidders play their weakly dominant strategy by submitting
their true values. Also suppose all the identities and all the bids except for the highest bid
are observed.
(a) Then function Q is bounded from above and below as follows:
d Y
i=1
























The example below illustrates the results of theorems 6.1 and 6.3. It is depicted in
￿gures 7 and 8.
Example 6.1. Consider the auction with three buyers. Let ~ X1, ~ X2, ~ X3 and A be indepen-
dent random variables distributed on [0;1] with distribution functions ~ F1(t) = t, ~ F2(t) = t2,
~ F3(t) =
p
t and ~ FA(t) = t. Let private values X1, X2 and X3 of the buyers be
X1 = 0:25 ~ X1 + 0:75A
X2 = 0:6 ~ X2 + 0:4A
X3 = 0:5 ~ X3 + 0:5A:
Figure 7 shows the bounds on the marginal distribution functions F1, F2 and F3 in the





















Figure 8. Bounds on the marginal distribution functions in the second scenario.
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437 Appendix A: Proofs of the results in section 3
In the Appendix, I use the following notations. L1[¿;»] stands for the class of Lebesgue integrable
functions on [¿;»]. The Euclidian norm of vector x = (x1;:::;xd) is denoted as kxk. kxk1 stands
for the following norm of x: kxk1 =
Pd
i=1 jxij. The right derivative of function v at point t is
DRv(t) = lim
h#0
v(t + h) ¡ v(t)
h
:
7.1 Proofs of Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.3




(t) = 1. Let t1 > t0 be very
close to t0 and let 0 < L < 1 be such that Fi(t) · L for any t 2 (t0;t1), i = 1;2;3. Consider the






(1 ¡ L)ds = (1 ¡ L)F2(t1)F3(t1);
G1(t1) · F2(t1)F3(t1):
Similarly, using the other two equations in (3.3), obtain that
(1 ¡ L)F1(t1)F3(t1) · G2(t1) · F1(t1)F3(t1);


















Because F1(t0) = 0 and t1 can be chosen arbitrarily close to t0, then L can be arbitrarily close to





Proof of Corollary 3.3. Conditions (3.2) follow from Proposition 3.2 and the fact that limt#t0 Fi(t) =
0, i = 1;2;3.
7.2 Strategy for proving identi￿cation
Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 follow from the proofs in sections 7.3 and 7.4.
As mentioned in section 3.5, my strategy for proving identi￿cation consists of two logical steps:
￿rst establishing local identi￿cation, then global identi￿cation.
It can be shown that (DE)-(IC) always has a negative local solution as well as a positive local
44solution.7 Conditions for uniqueness in the theory of di￿erential equations do not let us control
the sign of solutions. Therefore, even though I am interested only in a positive solution and can
neglect a negative one, su￿cient conditions that guarantee uniqueness of a positive local solution
cannot be derived from system (DE). To tackle this problem, I use auxiliary tools.
Auxiliary tools
I transform (DE) into a new system by introducing auxiliary functions H1, H2, H3:
H1 = F2F3; H2 = F1F3; H3 = F1F2:
Clearly, these functions are the distribution functions of maxfX2;X3g, maxfX1;X3g and maxfX1;X2g,












































Note that initial conditions Hi(t0) = 0 cannot be imposed because the right-hand sides of the
equations in this system are unde￿ned when Hi takes value 0. Instead, I can set conditions on
the upper limit of Hi at t0:
lim
t#t0
Hi(t) = 0; i = 1;2;3: (ICH)
The right-hand side of the last system is a vector-valued function that depends on t, H1, H2 and
























and rewrite the last system as
H0(t) = J(t;H(t)): (DEH)
I will refer to (DEH) as an auxiliary system and to problem (DEH)-(ICH) as an auxiliary problem.
De￿nition 7.1. Function H = (H1;H2;H3)tr is a solution to (DEH)-(ICH) on an interval
(t0;t0 + a] if Hi are absolutely continuous on (t0;t0 + a], satisfy (DEH) a.e. on (t0;t0 + a] and
also satisfy (ICH).
7See remark 7.4 for further explanation.
45Proof roadmap
Because formulas (7.1) account for the sign of Fi, we automatically consider positive solutions to
(DE)-(IC). Thereafter by a solution to (DE)-(IC) I will always mean a positive solution.
The local identi￿cation result is proved in steps. In the ￿rst step, I show that conditions (I) and
(II) are su￿cient to guarantee that problem (DEH)-(ICH), which is the auxiliary problem, has
a local solution. In the second step, I use formulas (7.1) to ￿nd Fi from Hi and show that these
Fi constitute a local solution to the main problem. Lastly, for the auxiliary problem, I establish
that its local solution that was found in the ￿rst step is unique. This implies that for the main
problem, its local solution that was found in the second step is the unique solution.
The global identi￿cation result is obtained from the local identi￿cation result by showing how
the unique local solution to (DE)-(IC) can be extended to the unique solution on the whole
support. The idea is to extend this local solution to small intervals progressively farther to the
right until the upper support point T is reached.
7.3 Local identi￿cation
Proving local identi￿cation is the most di￿cult part of the identi￿cation proof. I show that to
establish the existence of a local solution, I only need conditions (I) and (II). To obtain local
uniqueness, I use condition (III) as well as (I) and (II).
7.3.1 Existence of a local solution
I start by ￿nding an interval on which a local solution to the auxiliary problem (DEH)-(ICH)
and a local solution to the main problem (DE)-(IC) exist. Then I prove local existence for
(DEH)-(ICH) and use this result to establish local existence for (DE)-(IC).
Before moving on, I must introduce some notations and carry out preliminary technical work.
First of all, I have to indicate the domain of function J(t;H). Take into account formulas (7.1),
which express F through H, and note that for the auxiliary problem, we want to prove not only


















This accords with the fact that for function J(t;H) to be well de￿ned, the denominators in J(t;H)
must be separated from 0. To do that, choose any ± 2 (0;1) and allow H to take values only in
the following sets:
¹ H0(±) = (0;1)3 \ f(h1;h2;h3)tr : h2h3 · ±h1;h1h3 · ±h2;h2h3 · ±h1g:
Let ¹ D0(±) = [t0;T] £ ¹ H0(±) be the domain of J(t;H) (a.e. with respect to t). As we can see, ±
guarantees that the denominators in J(t;H) are separated from 0 by the value 1 ¡
p
±.
To determine an interval of existence for a local solution, I use conditions (II). Choose ° > 0
46such that °=(1 ¡
p
±)2 · ±. Let t0 + a, a > 0, be a point from [t0;T] such that









(t) · °: (7.3)
Conditions (II) guarantee that such t0 + a exists. Interval [t0;t0 + a] is an interval on which a
solution to problem (DEH)-(ICH) exists.
Auxiliary system with ²
The right-hand side J(t;H) of the auxiliary system (DEH) has singularities in H when H1 = 0
or H2 = 0 or H3 = 0. These singularities can be handled by using a very small ² > 0 and























together with initial conditions
























and rewrite the system with ² as
H0(t) = J²(t;H(t)): (DEH;²)
The de￿nition of a solution to (DEH;²)-(ICH;²) is analogous to De￿nition 7.1 and de￿nes a solution
on [t0;t0 + a] instead of (t0;t0 + a].
Introduce
¹ H(±) = [0;1)3 \ f(h1;h2;h3)tr : h2h3 · ±h1;h1h3 · ±h2;h2h3 · ±h1g
and let ¹ D(±) = [t0;T] £ ¹ H(±) be the domain of J²(t;H) (a.e. with respect to t). The di￿erence
between ¹ H(±) and ¹ H0(±) is that ¹ H(±) allows Hi to take value 0.
Lemma 7.1. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I) and (II). Let J²(t;H) be de￿ned
on ¹ D(±). Then (DEH;²)-(ICH;²) has a solution on [t0;t0 + a].
Proof. To prove this result, I use a Tonelli approximation approach, which builds special approx-
imations of a solution on very small intervals. These approximations have an important property
¡ when the lengths of the intervals go to zero, the sequence of approximations has a subsequence
converging to a solution to (DEH;²)-(ICH;²).
47Tonelli approximations are constructed step by step according to a speci￿ed rule. Consider,
for example, intervals [t0;t0 + 1
k], [t0 + 1
k;t0 + 2
k], ..., [t0 + r
k;t0 +a], where a · r+1
k , and k is very
large. For these intervals an approximation is built in the following way. First, an approximation
is found on [t0;t0 + 1
k], then it is extended to interval (t0 + 1
k;t0 + 2
k]. Next, the approximation
is extended to (t0 + 2
k;t0 + 3
k] and so on. This process is continued until the approximation is
constructed on the whole interval [t0;t0 + a].
A special feature of the Tonelli approach is that the extension of the approximation to (t0 +
i
k;t0+i+1
k ] is completely determined by the values of the approximating function on [t0+i¡1
k ;t0+ i
k]
and therefore does not require any knowledge about the approximation on [t0;t0 + i¡1
k ).
Now I turn to describing the rule of constructing approximations. The integration of both
sides in (DEH;²) yields H(t) =
R t
t0 J²(s;H)ds. For a given k, denote a corresponding Tonelli
approximation as Hk = (Hk
1;Hk
2;Hk












ds; t 2 [t0;t0 + a]: (7.4)




i (t) = 0; t 2 [t0 ¡ 1;t0]; i = 1;2;3:
Let me show that formula (7.4) is meaningful. In the ￿rst step, it de￿nes Hk(t) for t 2 [t0;t0 +
minf1
k;ag]. Because J²(s;Hk(s ¡ 1
k)) = (g1(s);g2(s);g3(s))tr for any s 2 [t0;t0 + minf1
k;ag] and
gi 2 L1[t0;t0 + a], then the integral on the right-hand side exists. For the next step to be well
de￿ned, I have to check that for t 2 [t0;t0 + minf1




3)tr belong to ¹ H(±). Indeed, Hk















3(t) · ± follow from (7.3) and the fact that ° < ±. Therefore, Hk(t) 2
¹ H(±).
In the second step, formula (7.4) de￿nes Hk on [t0 + 1
k;t0 + minf2
k;ag]. For t 2 [t0 + 1
k;t0 +
minf2























































































48Therefore, Hk(t) 2 ¹ H(±) for t 2 [t0 + 1
k;t0 + minf2
k;ag].
All subsequent steps are similar to the second step. By continuing to construct approximations
in this manner, I can eventually de￿ne function Hk on the whole interval [t0;t0 + a].
I take progressively smaller intervals and obtain a sequence of approximations fHkg. Because
for any k
kHk(t)k1 ·










functions Hk in this sequence are uniformly bounded. Moreover, sequence fHkg is equicontinuous,
a property that is implied by inequality (7.6) and the absolute continuity of Gi on [t0;t0 + a]:





; t;¿ 2 [t0;t0 + a]: (7.6)
According to the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, sequence fHkg is relatively compact in C([t0;t0+a]; ¹ H),
so it contains a subsequence fHkmg such that for some function H²
sup
t2[t0;t0+a]
kH²(t) ¡ Hkm(t)k1 ! 0









! J²(t;H²(t)) a:e: [t0;t0 + a]

















2 L1[t0;t0 + a];




J²(s;H²(s))ds; t 2 [t0;t0 + a]:
The last equation implies that H² is absolutely continuous and solves (DEH;²)-(ICH;²) a.e. on
[t0;t0 + a].
Local existence for the auxiliary problem
The next proposition formulates the local existence result for the auxiliary problem.
Proposition 7.2. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I) and (II). Let J(t;H) be
de￿ned on ¹ D0(±). Then (DEH)-(ICH) has a solution on (t0;t0 + a].
Proof. Choose a sequence ²m such that ²m ! 0 as m ! 1. For every ²m, denote a solution
constructed under Proposition 7.1 for this ²m as H²m. As I proved, for every ²m, function H²m is
absolutely continuous on [t0;t0 + a] and H²m
i (t) > 0, t 2 (t0;t0 + a].






; t 2 [t0;t0 + a];
and





; t;¿ 2 [t0;t0 + a]:
The last two inequalities and the Arzela-Ascoli theorem imply that sequence {H²m} is relatively
compact in C([t0;t0 + a]; ¹ H). Hence, it has a subsequence H²ml such that for some function H
sup
t2[t0;t0+a]
kH(t) ¡ H²ml(t)k1 ! 0
as l ! 1. Because
J² (t;H²ml(t)) ! J(t;H(t)) a:e: [t0;t0 + a]
as l ! 1, and a.e. on [t0;t0 + a]
kJ²ml (t;H²ml(t))k1 ·




2 L1[t0;t0 + a];




J(s;H(s))ds; t 2 [t0;t0 + a]:
From the last equation, it can be concluded that Hi are absolutely continuous on [t0;t0 + a] and
constitute a solution to (DEH)-(ICH) on (t0;t0 + a].
It is remarkable that this existence result does not require any assumptions on observable Gi
besides necessary conditions, which are satis￿ed in the model.
The proof of this proposition implies that if we take a solution H to (DEH)-(ICH) on (t0;t0+a]
and de￿ne the function for t0 as H(t0) = (0;0;0)tr, then this extended function is absolutely
continuous on [t0;t0 + a] and clearly satis￿es (DEH)-(ICH) a.e. on [t0;t0 + a]. In other words, a
solution H can be extended from (t0;t0 + a] to [t0;t0 + a].
The following explanation shows why I cannot use standard existence theorems to prove Propo-
sition 7.2. A general form of a system of di￿erential equations is
x0(t) = v(t;x(t));
where x and v are vector-valued functions. Let the initial condition be
x(t0) = x0:
In our problem, x is function H, and v(t;x) is J(t;H).8 Existence theorems are usually proved
8Even though initial conditions (ICH) characterize the limit at t0 rather than the value at t0, this does
not matter because, as I mentioned above, solution H can be extended from (t0;t0 + a] to [t0;t0 + a].
50for the situation in which the domain of v is [t0 ¡h;t0 +h]£B(x0) or [t0;t0 +h]£B(x0), where
B(x0) is an open ball with the center in x0.9 This property implies, for example, that x0 is an
interior point in the domain of v with respect to x. Existence theorems are also proved for some
more general cases, but all require, at the very least, x0 to be an interior point in the domain of
v with respect to x, and this domain must satisfy certain properties. Because of the speci￿city of
sets ¹ H0(±) and ¹ H(±) and the fact that the point of the initial conditions (0;0;0)tr is on the border
of these sets, I cannot apply any of those results. The method of Tonelli approximation allows me
to take into account the speci￿city of ¹ H0(±) and ¹ H(±) by verifying at each step that the values of
the constructed Tonelli function belong to the domain ¹ H(±).
Local existence for the main problem
Now that I have established the local existence result for the auxiliary problem (DEH)-(ICH),
I can turn to proving that the main problem (DE)-(IC) has a local solution. This result is easy
to obtain if we recall how H and F are related in formulas (7.1).
Theorem 7.3. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I) and (II). Then (DE)-(IC) has
a solution on [t0;t0 + a].
Proof. Let H be a solution to (DEH)-(ICH) on (t0;t0 + a]. For t > t0, de￿ne Fi according to
formulas (7.1), and let Fi(t0) = 0, i = 1;2;3. It follows from (DEH) that the ratios Hi
Gi have ￿nite















and, similarly, limt#t0 F2(t) = limt#t0 F3(t) = 0. Because functions Fi are absolutely continuous
on [t0 + ¢;t0 + a] for any ¢ 2 (0;a), and continuous at point t0, they are absolutely continuous
on [t0;t0 + a]. It is evident that Fi solve equations (DE) a.e. on [t0;t0 + a].
Observe that because J(t;H) is de￿ned on ¹ D0(±) and therefore a solution H to (DEH)-(ICH)
takes values only in ¹ H0(±), the values of the corresponding functions Fi belong to [0;
p
±] only.
The goal, however, is to identify Fi for all values in [0;1]. This will be possible because ± can be
arbitrarily close to 1.
Remark 7.4. The last thing about the local existence that is worth mentioning concerns the
comment made in section 7.2 about the existence of a negative function F that satis￿es (DE) a.e.







H3 , as follows from the de￿nition of functions Hi. Taking into
account that Fi are positive, I obtained (7.1) and substituted these formulas into (DE) to obtain














9For systems with discontinuous right-hand sides, this result is illustrated in Filippov (1988).
























Using the techniques of this section, it can be shown that (7.7) with initial conditions (ICH)
has a local solution H. This implies there is a negative function F that solves (DE) a.e. in a
neighborhood of t0.
7.3.2 Uniqueness of a local solution
The next step in the proof of local identi￿cation is to show that (DE)-(IC) has only one local
solution. Local existence was proved without imposing any assumptions on Gi besides necessary
conditions (I) and (II). To establish local uniqueness, I will assume that condition (III) is also
satis￿ed. In fact, condition (III) is the most important condition for proving uniqueness.
I start by stating the local uniqueness result. It relies mostly on conditions (3.1), which ￿nd
the rate of convergence of Fi at t0 in terms of observable functions Gi.
Theorem 7.5. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I), (II) and (III). Then (DE)-(IC)
has only one solution in a neighborhood of t0.
The idea of the proof of this theorem is to take two local solutions to problem (DE)-(IC) and
show that they coincide on their common interval of existence.
Suppose that F and ~ F are two local solutions to (DE)-(IC) with a common interval of existence
[t0;t0 + c], c > 0. Let Hi and ~ Hi be corresponding to them auxiliary functions:
H1 = F2F3; H2 = F1F3; H3 = F1F2;
~ H1 = ~ F2 ~ F3; ~ H2 = ~ F1 ~ F3; ~ H3 = ~ F1 ~ F2:
Clearly, if functions H and ~ H are identical, then F and ~ F coincide.
The lemma below is key to proving that functions H and ~ H are identical.
Lemma 7.6. Functions H and ~ H satisfy the following inequality a.e. on [t0;t0 + c]:


























and C > 0 is some constant.
52Proof. From (DEH) obtain
H0
i ¡ ~ H0
i =
gi(Fi ¡ ~ Fi)
(1 ¡ Fi)(1 ¡ ~ Fi)
; i = 1;2;3: (7.9)
From equalities
H1 ¡ ~ H1 = F2(F3 ¡ ~ F3) + ~ F3(F2 ¡ ~ F2)
H2 ¡ ~ H2 = F1(F3 ¡ ~ F3) + ~ F3(F1 ¡ ~ F1)
H3 ¡ ~ H3 = F1(F2 ¡ ~ F2) + ~ F2(F1 ¡ ~ F1);
￿nd that on (t0;t0 + c]
F1 ¡ ~ F1 = ¡
F1
~ F3(F2 + ~ F2)
(H1 ¡ ~ H1) +
F2
~ F3(F2 + ~ F2)
(H2 ¡ ~ H2) +
1
F2 + ~ F2
(H3 ¡ ~ H3)
F2 ¡ ~ F2 =
~ F2
~ F3(F2 + ~ F2)
(H1 ¡ ~ H1) ¡
F2 ~ F2
F1 ~ F3(F2 + ~ F2)
(H2 ¡ ~ H2) +
F2
F1(F2 + ~ F2)
(H3 ¡ ~ H3) (7.10)
F3 ¡ ~ F3 =
1
F2 + ~ F2
(H1 ¡ ~ H1) +
~ F2
(F2 + ~ F2)F1
(H2 ¡ ~ H2) ¡
~ F3
(F2 + ~ F2)F1
(H3 ¡ ~ H3):



























(t0 + c can be taken close enough to t0). Then on (t0;t0 + c],














jH3 ¡ ~ H3j














jH3 ¡ ~ H3j (7.11)














jH3 ¡ ~ H3j;
where K > 0 is a constant expressed in terms of C1 and C2. Let L > 0 be a constant that bounds
Fi and ~ Fi from above on [t0;t0 + c]. Denote C = K
(1¡L)2. Inequalities (7.11) and equations (7.9)
imply that a.e. on [t0;t0 + c]






















kH ¡ ~ Hk1:
Establishing inequality (7.8) is the most challenging part of proving local uniqueness.
53Notice that because H and ~ H solve the auxiliary problem (DEH)-(ICH), then a.e. on (t0;t0+c]
H0(t) = J(t;H(t));
~ H0(t) = J(t; ~ H(t)):
Therefore, inequality (7.8) can be rewritten as
kJ(t;H(t)) ¡ J(t; ~ H(t))k1 · ¡0(t)kH(t) ¡ ~ H(t)k1:
This last inequality is a generalized local Lipschitz condition for function J(t;H) with respect to
variable H. It is worth emphasizing that this inequality holds only for the values of functions H
and ~ H at the same point t but not for any two arbitrary values of variable H.
The following two lemmas prove that inequality (7.8) together with condition (III) yield that
H and ~ H are identical functions and, therefore, prove Theorem 7.5.
Lemma 7.7. Let z : [¿;»] ! <n be an absolutely continuous function. Then kzk1 has the right
derivative DRkzk1 a.e. on [¿;»], and
DRkz(t)k1 · kz0(t)k1 a:e: on [¿;»]:
Proof. Hartman (1964) proves a similar lemma for smooth functions for the maxnorm and the
euclidian norm. First, for any ￿xed i consider function jzij. Since zi is absolutely continuous, jzij
is absolutely continuous too. DRjzi(t)j then exists a.e. on [¿;»].
Let t 2 [¿;»] be a point in which zi has derivative. Use the de￿nition of the right derivative:
DRjzi(t)j = lim
h!+0
jzi(t + h)j ¡ jzi(t)j
h
to conclude that DRjzi(t)j = z0
i(t) if zi(t) > 0 and DRjzi(t)j = ¡z0
i(t) if zi(t) < 0. Indeed, if
zi(t) > 0, then zi(t + h) > 0 for small enough h, and DRjzi(t)j = z0
i(t). In a similar way we














In all three cases DRjzi(t)j · jz0
i(t)j.
Function kzk1 is the sum of absolutely continuous function and, hence, absolutely continuous.












Lemma 7.8. Let function v : [¿;»] ! < be absolutely continuous. Suppose that v(¿) = 0, and
a.e. on [¿;»]
DRv(t) · ¡(t)v(t); where ¡ 2 L1[¿;»]:
54Then
v(t) · 0; t 2 [¿;»]:
Proof. Results similar to the one in this lemma have been obtained by researchers on a more
general level. However, it is easier to prove this lemma directly than to show how it follows from
more general results.
Function Á(t) = v(t)e¡
R t




¿ ¡(s)ds ¡ ¡(t)v(t)e¡
R t
¿ ¡(s)ds · 0 a:e: [¿;»]:
Szarski (1965) uses Zygmund’s lemma to show that if Á is absolutely continuous and DRÁ(t) · 0
a.e. on [¿;»], then Á is non-increasing on [¿;»]. Since Á(¿) = 0, then Á(t) · 0 on [¿;»] and, hence,
v(t) · 0 on [¿;»].
Let me explain in more detail how these two lemmas imply that functions H and ~ H coincide
on [t0;t0 + c]. Consider [¿;»] = [t0;t0 + c]. In the ￿rst lemma, take z(t) = H(t) ¡ ~ H(t) and use
inequality (7.8) to obtain
DRkH(t) ¡ ~ H(t)k1 · ¡0(t)kH(t) ¡ ~ H(t)k1:
In the second lemma, let v(t) = kH(t) ¡ ~ H(t)k1 and ¡(t) = ¡0(t). Because condition (III)
holds, then according to this lemma, kH(t) ¡ ~ H(t)k1 · 0, t 2 [t0;t0 + c]. This means that
kH(t)¡ ~ H(t)k1 = 0, t 2 [t0;t0 +c], or, in other words, functions H and ~ H coincide on [t0;t0 +c].
In its turn, this implies that functions F and ~ F coincide on [t0;t0 + c] too.
To summarize, I have shown that, given conditions (I), (II) and (III) on observable functions
Gi, problem (DE)-(IC) has the unique solution F in a neighborhood of t0. As mentioned in
section 3, this solution is assumed to be monotone.
7.4 Global identi￿cation
Now I establish that the local solution to (DE)-(IC) can be extended to a solution on the entire
interval [t0;T], and that such extension is unique.
Consider Figure 3 and the local solution F on [t0;t0 + c] depicted on the left in this ￿gure.
Notice that all functions Fi take positive values at t0 + c and these values are known. Denote
them as vi = Fi(t0 + c);vi > 0. To extend the local solution to the right, I need to solve system
(DE) in a right-hand side neighborhood of t0 + c given that functions Fi in a solution to this
system take values vi at t0 + c. Clearly, results of theorems 7.3 and 7.5 cannot be used for this
problem because the methods in these theorems were developed for the situation when all initial
values of Fi are 0. Therefore, to carry out the extension process I ￿rst need to prove the local
existence and uniqueness result for the case when when all the initial values of Fi are positive.
557.4.1 Positive initial values
Let t1 2 (t0;T) and functions Fi satisfy initial conditions
Fi(t1) = vi; i = 1;2;3; (7.12)
where vi are known, 0 < vi < 1. Notice that the values of Gi(t1) are known.
I ￿rst consider the auxiliary system (DEH). The initial conditions on functions Hi are obviously
H1(t1) = v2v3; H2(t1) = v1v3; H3(t1) = v1v2: (7.13)
Proposition 7.9. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I). Then (DEH)-(7.13) has a
solution in a right-hand neighborhood of t1.
Proof. The proof uses the Tonelli approximations approach. It is similar to the proof of Lemma
7.1 and di￿ers from it by technical details.
Let me ￿rst specify the domain of the right-hand side J(t;H) of the auxiliary system (DEH)
and ￿nd a solution’s interval of existence. Let ¢ > 0 be any number such that ¢ < minf1 ¡
v1;1 ¡ v2;1 ¡ v3g. De￿ne set
¹ H(¢) = [0;1)3 \ f(h1;h2;h3)tr : h2h3 · (v1 + ¢)2h1;h1h3 · (v2 + ¢)2h2;h2h3 · (v3 + ¢)2h1g:
Let the domain of J(t;H) be ¹ D(¢) = [t1;T] £ ¹ H. For a given ¢, I can always choose a ° > 0
small enough so that
(1 + °)2v2
1 · (v1 + ¢)2; (1 + °)2v2
2 · (v2 + ¢)2; (1 + °)2v2
3 · (v3 + ¢)2:
Because limt#t1 Gi(t) = Gi(t1), there exists a point t1 + a1, a1 > 0, from [t1;T] such that
G1(t1 + a1) ¡ G1(t1) · °v2v3(1 ¡ v1 ¡ ¢)
G2(t1 + a1) ¡ G2(t1) · °v1v3(1 ¡ v2 ¡ ¢)
G3(t1 + a1) ¡ G3(t1) · °v1v2(1 ¡ v3 ¡ ¢):
Interval [t1;t1 + a1] is an interval on which a local solution exists.
Now I construct Tonelli approximations. For any natural number k let
Hk
1(t) = v2v3; Hk
2(t) = v1v3; Hk
3(t) = v1v2
for t 2 [t1¡1;t1]. Denote v0 = (v2v3;v1v3;v1v2)tr and let vi
0 be the i’s coordinate of v0, i = 1;2;3.
De￿ne function











ds; t 2 [t1;t1 + a1]: (7.14)
This formula is meaningful. In the ￿rst step it de￿nes H on [t1;t1 + minf1
k;a1g]. For t from this
interval the Lebesgue integral on the right-hand side exists because the integrand is bounded from










¯ ¯ ¯ ·
gi(s)
1 ¡ vi




Evidently, for t 2 [t1;t1 + minf1
k;a1g]
Hk












Let me show that Hk(t) 2 ¹ H for t 2 [t1;t1 + minf1








2(t) · v1v3 +
G2(t1 + a1) ¡ G2(t1)
1 ¡ v2
· v1v3 +
°v1v3(1 ¡ v2 ¡ ¢)
1 ¡ v2
· (1 + °)v1v3;
Hk









· (1 + °)2v2













· (v3 + ¢)2:
In the second step formula (7.14) de￿nes H on [t1+ 1
k;t1+minf2
k;a1g]. For t from this interval














1 ¡ vi ¡ ¢








2(t) · v1v3 +
G2(t1 + a1) ¡ G2(t1)
1 ¡ v2 ¡ ¢
· v1v3 + °v1v3 = (1 + °)v1v3;
Hk









· (1 + °)2v2
1 · (v1 + ¢)2:














· (v3 + ¢)2:
This process continues and de￿nes function Hk on the whole interval [t1;t1 + a1].
Now let me obtain the properties of sequence fHkg. Inequality
kHk(t)k1 · (1 + °)(v2v3 + v1v3 + v1v2)
for all t 2 [t1;t1 + a1] implies that sequence fHkg is uniformly bounded.
Because for any t;¿ 2 [t1;t1 + a1]
kHk(t) ¡ Hk(¿)k1 ·
jG1(t) ¡ G1(¿)j
1 ¡ v1 ¡ ¢
+
jG2(t) ¡ G2(¿)j
1 ¡ v2 ¡ ¢
+
jG3(t) ¡ G3(¿)j
1 ¡ v3 ¡ ¢
·
kG(t) ¡ G(¿)k1
1 ¡ maxfv1 + ¢;v2 + ¢;v3 + ¢g
;
and Gi are absolutely continuous on [t1;t1+a1], then sequence fHkg is equicontinuous. According
to the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, fHkg is relatively compact in C([t1;t1 +a1]; ¹ H). Hence, it contains
a subsequence Hkm such that for some function H,
sup
[t1;t1+a1]










! J(t;H(t)) a.e. on [t1;t1 + a1]













g1(t) + g2(t) + g3(t)
1 ¡ maxfv1 + ¢;v2 + ¢;v3 + ¢g
2 L1[t1;t1 + a];
then by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, H(t) solves
H(t) = v0 +
Z t
t1
J(s;H(s))ds; t 2 [t1;t1 + a1];
which implies that Hi are absolutely continuous and solve (DEH)-(7.13) on [t1;t1 + a1].
The existence result of Proposition 7.2 also required Gi to satisfy conditions (II). Note that
because the values of the underlying distribution functions Fi at t1 are separated from 0, then the
result of Proposition 7.9 does not require any conditions on the behavior of Gi around t1.
The next theorem establishes the local existence and uniqueness result for problem (DE)-(7.12).
It is noteworthy that conditions Fi(t1) > 0 guarantee uniqueness result without any additional
conditions on functions Gi.
Theorem 7.10. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I). Then (DE)-(7.12) has only
one solution in a right-hand neighborhood of t1.
58Proof. According to Proposition 7.9, problem (DEH)-(7.13) has a solution H on [t1;t1 + a1],














Clearly, F = (F1;F2;F3)tr is absolutely continuous and solves (DE)-(7.12) on [t1;t1 + a1].
The uniqueness proof is based on obtaining a generalized local Lipschitz condition (7.8). Let F
and ~ F be two local solutions of (DE)- (7.12). Without a loss of generality, assume that [t1;t1+a1]
is their common interval of existence. Let H and ~ H be their corresponding auxiliary functions:
H1 = F2F3; H2 = F1F3; H3 = F1F2;
~ H1 = ~ F2 ~ F3; ~ H2 = ~ F1 ~ F3; ~ H3 = ~ F1 ~ F2:
Functions H and ~ H solve the auxiliary system (DEH) a.e. on [t1;t1 + a1].
The proof of the uniqueness part of this theorem is much easier than the proof for problem
(DE)-(IC). Indeed, for (DE)-(IC), the di￿culty of proving uniqueness for stemmed from the
fact that all Fi had values 0 at t0. Now all Fi(t1) are positive. Use (7.10) and the fact that Fi
are separated from 0 in a neighborhood of t1 (without a loss of generality, a1 is small enough) to
obtain
jFi ¡ ~ Fij · KkH ¡ ~ Hk1
on [t1;t1 + a1] for some constant K. Exploit (7.9) and establish that for some constant C,
kH0(t) ¡ ~ H0(t)k1 · C(g1(t) + g2(t) + g3(t))kH(t) ¡ ~ H(t)k1:
a.e. on [t1;t1 + a1]. Because gi 2 L1[t1;t1 + a1], then lemmas 7.7 and 7.8 imply that H and ~ H
coincide on [t1;t1 + a1]. Hence, F and ~ F coincide on this interval too.
7.4.2 Extension of the local solution to the whole support
Now I turn to the ￿nal element of the identi￿cation proof. I demonstrate how the unique local
solution to (DE)-(IC) can be uniquely extended to a solution on the whole support. Throughout




H3 are strictly increasing.
To begin, recall that in the proof of the existence result in section 7.3.1, function J(t;H) was
de￿ned on ¹ D0(±) and the values of function H were restricted to set ¹ H(±) for a chosen 0 < ± < 1:
¹ H0(±) = (0;1)3 \ f(h1;h2;h3)tr : h2h3 · ±h1;h1h3 · ±h2;h2h3 · ±h1g:
Because the local solution to the auxiliary problem takes values only in this set, the functions
Fi in the corresponding local solution to the main problem (DEH)-(ICH) take values in [0;
p
±]
only. However, we also want to identify Fi when these functions take values above
p
±. Notice
that ± < 1 could be chosen arbitrarily close to 1, and this is what will allow extending the local
59solution to the whole support.
Fix ±, 0 < ± < 1, and let the domain of J(t;H) be ¹ D0(±) = [t0;T] £ ¹ H0(±) (a.e. with respect
to t). Theorem 7.5 proved that given conditions (I), (II) and (III), system (DEH) with initial
conditions (ICH) has the unique solution H = (H1;H2;H3) on some interval [t0;t0 + c]. Denote
t1 = t0 + c, and calculate
xi1 = Hi(t1); i = 1;2;3:
Because Hi are strictly increasing functions, then xi1 > 0. Note that H(t1) 2 ¹ H0(±). If H(t1) is










then (t1;H(t1)) is an interior point of ¹ D0(±), therefore J(t;H) is de￿ned in a neighborhood of this
point. This means that the auxiliary system (DEH), considered for t ¸ t1, with initial conditions
Hi(t1) = xi1; i = 1;2;3;
is a well-de￿ned problem. In light of the results of Proposition 7.9 and Theorem 7.10, this problem
has a unique solution H on some interval [t1;t1 + ¹], ¹ > 0. Thus, I can uniquely extend the
local solution found on [t0;t1] to a solution on the interval [t0;t1 + ¹]. Note that the value of
H(t1 + ¹) belongs to ¹ H0(±). If this value is in the interior of set ¹ H0(±), I can extend the solution
even farther to the right and continue this process until I reach a point in which the value of
function H becomes located on the border of set ¹ H0(±). This point determines the solution’s right
maximal interval of existence for the given value of ±.
De￿nition 7.2. An interval [t0;»] is the maximal interval of existence of solution H to (DEH)-
(ICH) if there does not exist an extension of H over an interval [t0;» +´] such that ´ > 0 and H
remains a solution to (DEH)-(ICH).
In the case that I am currently considering, the solution’s maximal interval of existence is
determined by the value of ± that was chosen to de￿ne set ¹ H0(±). The proposition below yields
an explicit formula for this interval.
Proposition 7.11. Let function J(t;H) be de￿ned on ¹ D0(±). Assume that all conditions on Gi
that guarantee existence and uniqueness of a local solution to (DEH)-(ICH) are satis￿ed. The













This proposition follows from the discussion above and therefore it is left without a proof.
Proposition 7.11 implies that for the given ±, [t0;T±] is the maximal interval of existence of
a corresponding solution F to problem (DE)-(IC). Also, the values of functions Fi on [t0;T±]
belong to [0;
p
±], and for point T±,










F1, F2, F3 on [t0;T±2]
Figure 9. Maximal intervals of existence of a solution to the main problem: [t0;T±1] corresponds
to ±1 (left), [t0;T±2] corresponds to ±2, where ±2 > ±1 (right).
Figure 9 depicts maximal intervals of existence of a solution F for values ±1 and ±2, where
±2 > ±1. Maximal interval [t0;T±1] corresponds to ±1, and maximal interval [t0;T±2] corresponds
to ±2. Because functions Fi are strictly increasing, then T±2 > T±1. Intuitively, if ± approaches 1,
then the maximal interval of existence approaches support [t0;T]. The theorem below establishes
this fact.
Theorem 7.12. Consider a strictly increasing sequence ±n, n ¸ 1, such that ±n < 1, and ±n ! 1
as n ! 1. Assume that all conditions on Gi that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a local
solution to problem (DEH)-(ICH) are satis￿ed. Let [t0;T±n] be the maximal interval of existence














and T±n is a strictly increasing sequence. If
Fi(T) = 1; i = 1;2;3; (7.16)
then T±n ! T as n ! 1.




sequence ±n are strictly increasing, equation (7.15) implies that sequence T±n is strictly increasing.
Because T±n increases and is bounded from above by T, it converges to some point ¹ T · T. If
¹ T < T, then we get a contradiction with the condition ±n ! 1 and conditions (7.16). Thus,
¹ T = T.






H3 , we can see that Theorem 7.12
guarantees that by choosing ± arbitrarily close to 1, we will identify Fi on the whole support
[t0;T]. This completes the proof of identi￿cation.
617.5 Auctions with any number of bidders
Proofs of propositions 3.6 and 3.7 and Corollary 3.8 are similar to those of propositions 3.1 and
3.2 and Corollary 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. I can use the same approach as in the case of three bidders. System
(3.6) can be rewritten in a convenient form by introducing d auxiliary functions H1, H2, ...,
Hd that stand for the distribution functions of maxfX2;X3;:::;Xdg, maxfX1;X3;:::;Xdg, :::,
maxfX1;X2;:::;Xd¡1g, respectively:
H1 = F2F3 :::Fd; H2 = F1F3 :::Fd; ::: ;Hd = F1F2 :::Fd¡1:



























; i = 1;:::;d: (7.18)
This system together with initial conditions
lim
t#t0
Hi(t) = 0; i = 1;:::;d: (7.19)
constitutes an auxiliary problem. To deal with discontinuities in H on the right-hand side in











; i = 1;:::;d:
As in the case of three bidders, ￿rst I can establish local existence for the auxiliary system
with ². Then I can show the existence of a local solution to the auxiliary problem (7.18)-(7.19)
by letting ² ! 0. After that, I can use formulas (7.17), which express F through H, to prove that
the main problem (3.6)-(3.7) has a local solution.10
Proof of Theorem 3.10. The existence part of this theorem follows from Theorem 3.9. To
prove the uniqueness part, let F and ~ F be two solutions to (3.6)-(3.7) with a common interval of
existence [t0;t0 + c], c > 0. Let
Hi = F1 :::Fi¡1Fi+1 :::Fd; ~ Hi = ~ F1 ::: ~ Fi¡1 ~ Fi+1 ::: ~ Fd; i = 1;:::;d:
The idea is to derive an inequality similar to (7.8). Use (7.17) and (7.18) to obtain that a.e. on
10A detailed proof of Theorem 3.9 is available upon request.
62[t0;t0 + c]
H0
i ¡ ~ Hi
0
=
gi(Fi ¡ ~ Fi)
(1 ¡ Fi)(1 ¡ ~ Fi)
: (7.20)
The de￿nitions of H and ~ H allow me to express H ¡ ~ H through F ¡ ~ F as follows:
H ¡ ~ H = B(F; ~ F)(F ¡ ~ F);
where a d £ d matrix B(F; ~ F) depends on F and ~ F in this way:





0 F3F4 :::Fd ~ F2F4 :::Fd ~ F2 ~ F3F5 :::Fd ::: ~ F2 ~ F3 ::: ~ Fd¡1
F3F4 :::Fd 0 ~ F1F4 :::Fd ~ F1 ~ F3F5 :::Fd ::: ~ F1 ~ F3 ::: ~ Fd¡1
::: ::: ::: :::






The result of Proposition 3.7 implies that limt#t0
Fi
~ Fi(t) = 1. Therefore, for a t close enough to t0
(without a loss of generality, I can assume that t0 + c is close enough to t0), matrix B(F; ~ F) can
be written as
B(F; ~ F) = (I + Mo(1)(F; ~ F))B0(F);
where I is the d £ d identity matrix, Mo(1)(F; ~ F) is a d £ d matrix such that each of its elements






0 F3F4 :::Fd F2F4 :::Fd F2F3F5 :::Fd ::: F2F3 :::Fd¡1
F3F4 :::Fd 0 F1F4 :::Fd F1F3F5 :::Fd ::: F1F3 :::Fd¡1
::: ::: ::: :::
















1 F1F2 F1F3 F1F4 ::: F1Fd
F1F2 ¡(d ¡ 2)F2
2 F2F3 F2F4 ::: F2Fd
::: ::: ::: :::







Thus, F ¡ ~ F can be expressed through H ¡ ~ H as
F ¡ ~ F = B¡1
0 (F)(I + Mo(1)(F; ~ F))¡1(H ¡ ~ H): (7.21)
The next step is to bound on [t0;t0+c] the absolute values of the elements in B¡1
0 (F) by observable
functions. This is achieved by using the result of Proposition 3.7. Take, for instance, the element
63B¡1






(d ¡ 1)F2 :::Fd
¯ ¯















for some constant K11. Consider another cell in B¡1
0 (F), for example, the element B¡1
0 (F)12 in






(d ¡ 1)F3 :::Fd
¯









for some constant K12. For the other elements, bounds are found in a similar way. Then equations
(7.20) and (7.21) yield that a.e. on [t0;t0 + c]














kH ¡ ~ Hk1
for some constant C. The last inequality and lemmas 7.7 and 7.8 imply that H and ~ H coincide
on [t0;t0 + c], and hence, F and ~ F coincide on [t0;t0 + c].
7.6 Auctions with two types of bidders
Proof of Theorem 3.11.
Necessity is obvious. Su￿ciency follows from theorem 3.12 by considering Ã(x) = ¡lnx,
x 2 (0;1].
Proof of Theorem 3.12.
Let















;1) = Ã¡1 (kÃ(FI(t)) + (d ¡ k ¡ 1)Ã(FII(t))):



















I analyze it together with initial conditions
§I(t0) = §II(t0) = 0: (7.23)
It is enough to show that problem (7.22)-(7.23) can have only one solution in a neighborhood
of t0. Then the extension of this solution along the whole support will be unique too.
System (7.22) implies that for any point from the support









= kGI + (d ¡ k)GII:
Suppose that problem (7.22)-(7.23) has two solutions (§I;§II) and (~ §I; ~ §II) with a common
interval of existence [t0;t0 + a]. I want to show that for any t 2 [t0;t0 + a], §I(t) ¸ ~ §I(t) i￿
§II(t) · ~ §II(t). Fix t 2 (t0;t0 + a]. From the equation



































A(§I ¡ ~ §I) =















A(~ §II ¡ §II);
(7.24)
where §¤
I = ®§I +(1¡®)~ §I for some ® = ®(§I(t); ~ §I(t);§II(t)) 2 [0;1], and §¤
II = ¯§II +(1¡







































65Therefore, from (7.24) I obtain that §I(t) ¸ ~ §I(t) i￿ §II(t) · ~ §II(t). Now I want show that this
and the fact that the function
Ã00(x)
(Ã0(x))2 is increasing imply that
(§0
I ¡ ~ §0
I)(§I ¡ ~ §I) · 0; (§0
II ¡ ~ §0
II)(§II ¡ ~ §II) · 0 a:e: [t0;t0 + a]:
Suppose that for a given point t 2 (t0;t0 + a], at which the derivatives §0
I and ~ §0
I exist, it holds
that §I ¸ ~ §I. Let us prove that §0
I ¡ ~ §0
I · 0. From (7.22) obtain that
§0
































Because §II · ~ §II, then
§0





















d¡1Ã(~ §II))) < 1, then ~ §I > Ã¡1( k
d¡1Ã(~ §I) + d¡k
d¡1Ã(~ §II)), and there-
fore, §I > Ã¡1( k
d¡1Ã(~ §I) + d¡k
d¡1Ã(~ §II)).









I ¡ ~ §0
I · 0.
























The last inequality holds because of the assumption that
Ã00(x)
(Ã0(x))2 is increasing and the condition
y1 > Ã¡1( k
d¡1Ã(y1) + d¡k
d¡1Ã(y2)).
To summarize, we have established that
(§0
1 ¡ ~ §0




(§1 ¡ ~ §1)2 · 0 a:e: [t0;t0 + a]:
This inequality and (7.23) imply that §1 and ~ §1 coincide in a neighborhood of t0.
In a similar way, it can be shown that
d
dt
(§2 ¡ ~ §2)2 · 0 a:e: [t0;t0 + a]
and, therefore, §2 and ~ §2 coincide in a neighborhood of t0.
8 Appendix B: Proofs of the results in section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let F, ~ F 2 ¤, and G = A(F), ~ G = A( ~ F). For convenience, I
temporarily use the following metric:




jFj(t) ¡ ~ Fj(t)j




jGj(t) ¡ ~ Gj(t)j:
From the de￿nition of A,





(1 ¡ F1)ds ¡
Z t
t0
( ~ F2 ~ F3)
0
(1 ¡ ~ F1)ds =





(F1 ¡ ~ F1)ds +
Z t
t0





Integration by parts yields










1(F2F3 ¡ ~ F2 ~ F3)ds:
Knowing that ~ F1 and F2F3 are distribution functions, obtain that for any t 2 [t0;T],
jG1(t) ¡ ~ G1(t)j · 2 sup
[t0;T]
jF2F3 ¡ ~ F2 ~ F3j + sup
[t0;T]
jF1 ¡ ~ F1j · 3d1(F; ~ F):
After arriving at similar inequalities for G2 ¡ ~ G2 and G3 ¡ ~ G3,
3 X
j=1
jGj(t) ¡ ~ Gj(t)j · 9d1(F; ~ F); t 2 [t0;T];
and, hence,
d1(G; ~ G) · 9d1(F; ~ F):
67Because
d1(F; ~ F) ·
p
3d(F; ~ F) and d1(G; ~ G) ¸ d(G; ~ G); (8.1)
then




d(A(F);A( ~ F)) · 9
p
3d(F; ~ F):
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Because F 2 ¤Á, then there exists a sequence Fn 2 ¤Á such that
d(Fn;F) ! 0 as n ! 1. Take any two points t1;t2 2 [t0;T] and any Fi, i = 1;2;3. Convergence
in metric d implies point-wise convergence. Therefore,
jFj(t1) ¡ Fj(t2)j = lim
n!1jFn;j(t1) ¡ Fn;j(t2)j · jÁ(t1) ¡ Á(t2)j:
The last inequality and the absolute continuity of Á imply that Fi is absolutely continuous. Func-
tions Fn;i are strictly increasing and converge to Fi point-wise, so Fi are increasing. Fn;i(t0)
converge to Fi(t0). Hence, Fi(t0) = 0. In a similar way, it can proved that Fi(T) = 1.
Because Fi are absolutely continuous, they can di￿erentiated a.e. on [t0;T]. Let t be a point
at which both Fi and Á have derivatives. For any ￿xed h,




Fn;i(t + h) ¡ Fn;i(t)
h
·
Á(t + h) ¡ Á(t)
h
:
Taking the limit as h ! 0, we obtain that F0
i(t) · Á0(t).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1. Let F, ~ F 2 ¤Á
and G = A(F), ~ G = A( ~ F). Integration by parts yields










1(F2F3 ¡ ~ F2 ~ F3)ds:
Therefore, for any t 2 [t0;T],
jG1(t) ¡ ~ G1(t)j · (1 + Á(T) ¡ Á(t0)) sup
[t0;T]
jF2F3 ¡ ~ F2 ~ F3j + 2(Á(T) ¡ Á(t0)) sup
[t0;T]
jF1 ¡ ~ F1j ·
· (1 + 3Á(T) ¡ 3Á(t0))d1(F; ~ F):
Similar inequalities for G2 ¡ ~ G2 and G3 ¡ ~ G3 imply that
d1(G; ~ G) · 3(1 + 3Á(T) ¡ 3Á(t0))d1(F; ~ F):
Taking into account (8.1),
d(A(F);A( ~ F)) · C0d(F; ~ F); where C0 = 3
p
3(1 + 3Á(T) ¡ 3Á(t0)):
68Proof of Proposition 4.4. Let G0 2 A(¤Á) and d(Gn;G0) ! 0 as n ! 1 for Gn 2 A(¤Á).
Denote F0 = A¡1G0, Fn = A¡1Gn. Clearly, F0, Fn 2 ¤Á. I want to show that d(Fn;F0) ! 0
as n ! 1. Notice that the sequence Fn is equicontinuous, as all functions in the sequence are
bounded and
jFn(t1) ¡ Fn(t2)j · jÁ(t1) ¡ Á(t2)j
for any t1;t2 2 [t0;T]. According to the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, there is a convergent subsequence
Fnk. Let F¤ be the limit of Fnk. Because F¤ 2 ¤Á and A is continuous on ¤Á,
d(AFnk;AF¤) ! 0:
Thus, AF¤ = G0. Given that on A(¤Á) inverse A¡1 is de￿ned, F¤ = F0.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Q(F¤) = 0. Because the inverse operator A¡1 exists on A(¤Á), then
A(F) 6= G¤ and, hence, Q(F) > 0 for any F 2 ¤Á, F 6= F¤. Now consider F 2 ¤Án¤Á. Taking
into account the result of Proposition 4.2, conclude that there is a function Fi in F that is constant
on some interval in [t0;T]. There are two possible cases for F: when (a) Fi(t) > 0 for t > t0,
i = 1;2;3, and (b) some Fi takes value 0 in a right-hand side neighborhood of t0. In the ￿rst
case, A(F) 6= G¤ because the uniqueness result was proved without the assumption of the strict
monotonicity of Fi. In the second case, without a loss of generality assume that F1(t) = 0,
t 2 [t0;t0 + !). Then G2(t) = 0 and G3(t) = 0, t 2 [t0;t0 + !), for the corresponding G = A(F).
Because G¤
i(t) > 0 for t > t0, i = 1;2;3, then obviously A(F) 6= G¤.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. To prove this theorem, I use lemmas A1 and A2 from Newey and Powell
(2003). Consistency will hold if all conditions in Lemma A1 are satis￿ed. I divide these conditions
into three groups, as in Newey and Powell (2003).
(i) According to Lemma 4.5, F¤ is the unique minimizer of Q on ¤Á.
(ii) Set ¤Á is compact. Let me show that Q and ^ Qn are continuous on ¤Á and
sup
F2¤Á
j ^ Qn(F) ¡ Q(F)j
p
! 0: (8.2)
The continuity of Q and ^ Qn will follow from the properties of A on ¤Á. First, consider Q. For
any F, ~ F 2 ¤Á




(A( ~ F)j ¡ A(F)j)(2G¤
j ¡ A(F)j ¡ A( ~ F)j)j:
For any t 2 [t0;T], A(F)j(t) · 1 and G¤
j(t) · 1, j = 1;2;3, therefore
jQ(F) ¡ Q( ~ F)j · 4E
3 X
j=1
jA( ~ F)j ¡ A(F)jj:
69Applying the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and (4.1),




(A( ~ F) ¡ A(F))tr(A( ~ F) ¡ A(F)) · 4
p
3d(A(F);A( ~ F)) · 4
p
3C0d(F; ~ F):
Thus, function Q is Lipschitz and therefore continuous.
Now consider function ^ Qn. Similar to the methods described above,
























(A( ~ F)(ti) ¡ A(F)(ti))tr(A( ~ F)(ti) ¡ A(F)(ti)) ·
· 4
p
3d(A(F);A( ~ F)) · 4
p
3C0d(F; ~ F):
Property (8.2) will follow from Lemma A2 in Newey and Powell (2003). Indeed, it is clear that
8(F 2 ¤Á) ^ Qn(F)
p
! Q(F):
This fact combined with (8.3) implies (8.2).
(iii) This condition follows from assumption (4.2).
Conditions (i)-(iii) imply the consistency property (4.6).
9 Appendix C: Identi￿cation in generalized competing
risks models
First, I outline Meilijson’s approach. From (5.3), Meilijson obtains a system of integral equations






expf¡ ¹ M log(1 ¡ F(s))dG(s)g
¾
;
where matrix ¹ M is such that ¹ M(i;j) = 1¡M(i;j) and ~ T = (MtrM)¡1Mtr. He suggests applying
to these equations a ￿xed point theorem for multidimensional functional spaces. As I mentioned,
however, his proofs miss important parts.
I now turn to describing my method. The rank condition implies that m ¸ d ¡ that is, there
are at least as many minimal fatal sets as the number of the elements in a coherent system. First,
I consider the case of m = d and assume that the rank condition for the incidence matrix M holds




Fj; i = 1;:::;d;
70and denote H = (H1;:::;Hd)tr. The rank condition guarantees that functions Fi, i = 1;:::;d,
taking into account that they are positive, are uniquely expressed through functions Hi, i =




logFj; i = 1;:::;d:






j ; i = 1;:::;d: (9.1)
Similar to the auction problem, I obtain an auxiliary system of di￿erential equations by rewriting













´; i = 1;:::;d: (9.2)
Functions Hi satisfy initial conditions
lim
t#t0
Hi(t) = 0; i = 1;:::;d: (9.3)
As with the auction, the existence and uniqueness theorems 5.1 and 5.2 can be proved in steps.
First, the results are obtained locally, then globally.
The existence of a local solution to (5.3)-(5.4) can be proved in the following way. First, to
avoid discontinuities in H, I can modify the auxiliary system (9.2) by introducing a very small
number ² when necessary. Using Tonelli approximations, I can establish the existence of a local
solution for the auxiliary system with ². After that, I can take the limit as ² ! 0 and show the
existence of a local solution for (9.2)-(9.3). Then I can use formulas (9.1) to obtain the existence
of a local solution to problem (5.3)-(5.4). To establish local uniqueness, I obtain a generalized
local Lipschitz condition on Hi.
Finally, I can show that the unique local solution can be extended to the whole support, and
that such extension is unique. Again, the monotonicity of Fi in this solution has to be assumed.
Below I prove the local uniqueness part of Theorem 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let F and ~ F be two local solutions to (5.3)-(5.4) with a common
interval of existence [t0;t0 + c]. Let H and ~ H be the corresponding auxiliary functions. Then H



























A plan is to derive a generalized local Lipschitz condition on Hi and then use lemmas 7.7 and 7.8
to establish that H and ~ H coincide. This will imply that F and ~ F coincide. Consider Hi ¡ ~ Hi for
71any i and let jIc
ij be the number of elements in Ic
i. Then a.e. on [t0;t0 + c]
jH0













i (1 ¡ Fj)
Q
j2Ic
















i (1 ¡ Fj)
Q
j2Ic









jFj ¡ ~ Fjj
for some constant Ci. Di￿erences jFj¡ ~ Fjj can be bounded from above by expressions of jHj¡ ~ Hjj.
According to (9.1), for t > t0,


























h ¡ ~ H
kjh
h )
For x1;x2 > 0, by the mean value theorem
x®
l ¡ x®
2 = ®(µx1 + (1 ¡ µ)x2)®¡1(x1 ¡ x2);
where µ = µ(x1;x2) 2 [0;1]. If ® ¸ 1, then
jx®
l ¡ x®
2j · ®(maxfx1;x2g)®¡1jx1 ¡ x2j:
If ® < 1, then
jx®
l ¡ x®
2j · j®j(minfx1;x2g)®¡1jx1 ¡ x2j:
Because Hh(t); ~ Hh(t) > 0 for t > t0, then for t > t0,
jH
kjh
h (t) ¡ ~ H
kjh

























72Thus, for t > t0,










h jkjhjjHh ¡ ~ Hhj
for some constants Lj > 0. Thus, a.e. on [t0;t0 + c]
jH0














h (t)jkjhjjHh(t) ¡ ~ Hh(t)j
for some constants Di > 0 and, hence,
jjH0(t) ¡ ~ H0(t)jj1 · C(¡1(t) + :::¡d(t))jjH(t) ¡ ~ H(t)jj1
for some constant C > 0. This inequality and lemmas 7.7 and 7.8 imply that H(t) = ~ H(t),
t 2 [t0;t0 + c].
10 Appendix D: Bounds on distributions
Proof of Theorem 6.1.
(a) First, I prove the result for the lower bound. Suppose that maxk=1;:::;r tik < T. Then
QD(ti1;:::;tir) = P(\r
k=1(Xik · tik)) = P(\r





















Now consider the case when at least one of tik takes value T. It is enough to consider the case
when ti1 = T and maxk=2;:::;r tik < T. Denote ~ D = fi2;:::;irg. From what I have shown above,
it follows that































(b) For any D = fti1;:::;tirg, if mink=1;:::;r tik = t0 then QD(ti1;:::;tir) = 0 because by assump-
tion all marginal distributions Xi are continuous and, therefore, do not have mass points. Suppose
that mink=1;:::;r tik > t0.
Q(t1;:::;td) = P(\d
i=1(Xi · ti)) = P(\d
i=1(bi · ti)) =
X
j



























To obtain an upper bound for D = fti1;:::;tirg that contains at most d ¡ 2 elements, use the
upper bound for Q and substitute values of tj, j = 2 D, with the value of T.
Proof of Proposition 6.2.
(a) According to AI, for any D = fti1;:::;tirg, the event f\r
k=1(Xik · tik)g implies the event
f\r
k=1(bik · tik)g. Therefore,
QD(ti1;:::;tir) = P(\r
k=1(Xik · tik)) · P(\r
k=1(bik · tik)):
The rest of the proof for the upper bounds is the same as in Theorem 6.1.
(b) Suppose that maxk=1;:::;r tik < T. Then
QD(ti1;:::;tir) = P(\r













k=1(Xik · tik);j wins):
According to AII, for j 2 CD, the event fprice · mink=1;:::;r tik;j winsg implies the event
f\r
k=1(Xik · tik);j winsg. Indeed, if some Xik was larger than tik, then bidder ik would not allow







The rest of the proof for the lower bounds is the same as in Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.3.



















74(b) Without a loss of generality, consider function F1.


























bl < bh;bh < bi;b1 · t):
Let t 2 (t0;T]. For the upper bound,






























Let t 2 [t0;T). For the lower bound,








































Evidently, F1(t0) = 0 and F1(T) = 1.
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